In a recent article, Modigliani and Pogue [2] raised the issue of “leverage bias” in portfolio performance measures. Specifically, they contended that the value of the Jensen's alpha (α) could be affected by borrowing or lending at the risk-free rate, while the Treynor index (TI) does not suffer from this shortcoming. They illustrated this effect through the use of a graphical example similar to the one in Exhibit I where A and B are two unlevered portfolios with the same α's but different TI's. Modigliani and Pogue argued that by leveraging, i.e., borrowing at Rf, the portfolio with the greater slope (TI), A, could attain a levered portfolio AL which clearly dominates portfolio B. In other L words, the line with the higher TI will dominate the line with a lower TI regardless of α values. This seems to imply that, in general, TI is a better measure of ex post portfolio performance, and that ranking based on TI's is consistent and invariant to the leverage effect, while ranking based on a's is not.

This study provides, as a result of comprehensive search, a better description of the intertemporal behaviors of corporate debt policy, comparable to those that exist for dividend policy. Although leverage policy may vary a great deal from firm to firm, we found that: (1) The rather simple partial adjustment model with constant payout ratio to have the best predictive performance and other superior models include the first-order markov process and the historical average leverage ratio; (2) in general, firms seem to operate with a concept of “target leverage ratio, ” e.g., target ratio computed from the partial adjustment models, or from historical or industry averages; (3) there is some weak evidence of the presence of unused debt capacity for the total sample; (4) the average speed of adjustment to close the gap between the desired and actual leverage ratio is a respectable 67 percent in the first year (due to the lumpiness of debt issue, individual firms tend to be either under or overadjusted); (5) there are some indications that firms also adjust debt behavior to anticipated future increases or decreases in assets.There are several areas for future research, for instance, the best debt model could serve as the first stage of a possible two-stage equation in the empirical verification of the MSM's assumption of the independence of the investment decision to the financing decision (e.g., [7]), on a further exploration of how firms' expectations affect debt behavior. Finally, the existence of a rational target leverage ratio should encourage research interest concerning the existence of an empirically testable optimal leverage ratio.

The purpose of this note is to present a simple computational algorithm to approximate the E, S portfolio selection model. The essential feature of the model is the utilization of the familiar linear programming framework by representing risks as a series of linear constraints. Suppose we have m states and n securities, and we assume the investor is able to specify the contingent returns for all securities in each state. Following [7], we define risk as being the downside deviation from the investor's target rate of return.

IN making dividend decisions, the firm determines the division of earnings between reinvestment and distribution to stockholders. There are two general issues in the area of dividend policy: The first concerns the determinants of the firm's payout ratio (the ratio of dividends to earnings). The second issue concerns the intertemporal change of dividends. The focus of this paper is on the second issue. There are two prevailing views on the behavior of corporate dividend policies over time; the informational content and the partial adjustment hypothesis. In the following sections, both hypotheses are shown leading to empirically equivalent expressions. To avoid this confusion, we suggest an approach that would differentiate between the two hypotheses. Empirical results analyzing dividends behavior of twenty broad industry categories are summarized.

We analyze how firms manage their financial flexibility conditional on the expected probability of recession. Using an ex ante measure of future recession, we find that, in the aggregate, firms do not appear to prepare. However, a closer analysis reveals a more nuanced relation. The lack of preparation in aggregate is driven by firms that may be unable to prepare: financially constrained and cash poor firms. We find some evidence that firms able to prepare, unconstrained and cash rich firms, may prepare for future recessions.

ABSTRACT This study investigates the differences in the behaviors between the speculative investors and the conservative investors in two separate experimental markets. Although the market for speculators shows greater price volatility in both bid/ask spread within a trade as well as with intraperiod variances, it exhibits several desirable properties. Specifically, the price patterns tend to converge closer, and at a greater speed to either the prior information equilibrium price or the rational expectation equilibrium price. It also achieves better allocational efficiency. And, it is also less likely to be misled by potentially “false” price information.