ABSTRACT Contrary to conventional wisdom, growth stocks (i.e., low book‐to‐market stocks) do not have substantially higher future cash‐flow growth rates than value stocks, in both rebalanced and buy‐and‐hold portfolios. Efficiency growth, survivorship and look‐back biases, and the rebalancing effect help explain the results. These findings suggest that duration alone is unlikely to explain the value premium.

The wisdom of crowds suggests that groups with more diversely informed individuals reach more informed decisions because their members are collectively more knowledgeable. I study this idea in the context of the market's response to earnings announcements by examining how information diversity across investors affects the efficiency of the price response to earnings news. I measure investors' information diversity based on their geographic dispersion, which I estimate using the locations of the requests for firms' filings to EDGAR. Greater geographic dispersion is associated with greater trading during the announcement period; this supports the use of geographic dispersion as a measure of information diversity. Consistent with my predictions, the price response to a firm's earnings news is more efficient when the firm's investors have greater information diversity. In further analysis, I find that the initial heightened trading for firms with more diversely informed investors subsides quickly after the announcement period.

This paper investigates how firms’ pollution incentives are influenced by their ability to divest polluted assets. My empirical setting is a major reform that exempts purchasers from liability for past contamination. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I find that the reform reduces toxic emissions, lowers bankruptcy risk, and increases firm value. Cross-sectional tests show that the decline in emissions is driven by firms with weaker financial health and fewer assets. These findings highlight a novel net worth channel: by limiting ex-post liability, the reform enhances landowners’ net worth ex-ante, reducing their incentives to engage in risky behavior, such as excessive emissions.

We examine a simple measure of operating leverage: the ratio of fixed costs (measured by depreciation and amortization plus selling, general, and administrative expenses) to the market (or book) value of assets. We find that this measure of operating leverage positively predicts returns. This operating leverage measure is not explained by common factors and performs better than the traditional measures of operating leverage. Furthermore, an exploratory two-factor model with the operating leverage factor works at least as well as, but does not subsume, the Fama and French five-factor model. (JEL G11, G12, G30)

Investment-cash flow sensitivity has declined and disappeared, even during the 2007–2009 credit crunch. If one believes that financial constraints have not disappeared, then investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial constraints. The decline and disappearance are robust to considerations of R&D and cash reserves, and across groups of firms. The information content in cash flow regarding investment opportunities has declined, but measurement error in Tobin's q does not completely explain the patterns in investment-cash flow sensitivity. The decline and disappearance cannot be explained by changes in sample composition, corporate governance, or market power—and remain a puzzle.

We propose a naïve model averaging (NMA) method that averages the OLS out-of-sample forecasts and the historical means and produces mostly positive out-of-sample R2s for the variables significant in sample in forecasting market returns. Surprisingly, more sophisticated weighting schemes that combine the predictive variable and historical mean do not consistently perform better. With unstable economic relations and a limited sample size, sophisticated methods may lead to overfitting or be subject to more estimation errors. In such situations, our simple methods may work better. Model misspecification, rather than declining return predictability, likely explains the predictive performance of the NMA method. (JEL G12, G11) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We study whether the constraints on firms’ operations imposed by labor unions affect firms’ costs of equity. The cost of equity is significantly higher for firms in more unionized industries. This effect holds after controlling for several industry and firm characteristics, is robust to endogeneity concerns, and is not driven by omitted variables. Moreover, the unionization premium is stronger when unions face a more favorable bargaining environment and is highly countercyclical. Unionization is also positively related to various measures of operating leverage. Our findings suggest that labor unions increase firms’ costs of equity by decreasing firms’ operating flexibility.