The observed differences in wages across industries may arise from a lack of worker mobility, particularly among experienced workers, allowing the effects of industry shocks to persist for some time. Although young workers arbitrage wage shocks, they will have little effect on the dispersion of experienced workers' wages if young and old workers are poor substitutes in production. This explanation is investigated using the five Censuses of Population between 1940 and 1980. The evidence strongly suggests that differences in pay are not temporary phenomena. The data provide some support for the role of human capital and ability.

Why do private firms stay private? Empirical evidence on this issue is sparse, as most private firms in the U.S. do not report their financial results. We investigate why private status matters by taking advantage of a unique dataset of large, leveraged private firms with SEC filings. Unlike a number of other studies, we find that neither the existence of growth opportunities, nor the desire of firm founders to diversify, is a principal determinant of the decision whether or not to retain private status. Rather, the existence of private benefits of control appears to serve as the most significant incentive to stay private. Family-controlled firms have significantly lower probabilities of filing for an IPO, while a board structure that grants management relatively more autonomy lowers the probability of an IPO filing as well. Cross-sectional analysis of profitability and ex post performance suggests that while private benefits of control may encourage firms to stay private, they do not have detrimental effects on firm efficiency. In contrast, firms controlled by private equity specialists appear to place a low value on control benefits and are likely to go public as a means of cashing out.

This paper investigates close bank–firm relations (keiretsu) among troubled Japanese firms by examining the type of bankruptcy. In Japan, creditors control the fate of the bankrupt firm, which may be costly if managers destroy firm value to avoid bankruptcy or, alternatively, if creditors liquidate too often. Recently, researchers have argued that keiretsu banks prop up weak firms that should fail. We find that bankrupt firms affiliated with keiretsu banks are neither subject to excessive liquidation by overly powerful banks nor slower to be liquidated. Keiretsu banks liquidate via the courts often, perhaps to avoid political repercussions and organized crime.

This paper analyzes junk bond defaults during 1980 to 1991 to determine which factors affect the length of time spent in default. Bondholder holdouts are not a significant problem, as firms with proportionately more bonds have shorter default spells. In contrast, bank debt is associated with slower restructurings. Bargaining problems arising from contingent liabilities, lawsuits, and size delay the process, although multiple bond classes do not. Neither information problems nor firm value appear to matter. HLTs do not resolve their defaults at a significantly faster pace. Defaults tend to take less time in the 1990s, despite Drexel's disappearance from the market.

We test the pecking order model of capital structure by examining the financing of firms that went public in 1983. We estimate a logit to predict external financing, and a multinomial logit to predict the type of financing using data on the IPO firms' security offerings during 1984–1992. Our results indicate that the probability of obtaining external funds is unrelated to the shortfall in internally generated funds, although firms with cash surpluses avoid external financing. Firms that access the capital markets do not follow the pecking order when choosing the type of security to offer.

Larger bonds offer greater liquidity, which should reduce their yields. A simple way for firms to reduce financing costs is to sell bonds with large face values. We find that mega-bonds are more liquid than smaller bonds. However, offering yield spreads on mega-bonds are not lower and are higher than spreads of bonds issued by similar companies. The discount applied to large new issues is consistent with price pressure effects that are also present in the secondary market prices of the issuing firm's existing bonds. Our results suggest a hidden cost to issuing very liquid bonds.

The Lehman bankruptcy highlights the potential for interconnectedness to cause negative externalities through counterparty contagion, but the externalities may also arise from information contagion. We examine troubled financial firms and find that both channels are significant factors in creating spillover effects. Counterparty contagion is greater in cases of riskier firms and larger and more complex exposures. However, the counterparty exposures are small, especially among banks that face diversification regulations, and do not typically cause a cascade of failures. Information contagion is stronger for rivals in the same markets and has a larger impact in cases of distress than in bankruptcies.

Many theoretical bond pricing models predict that the credit yield curve facing risky bond issuers is downward‐sloping. Previous empirical research (Sarig and Warga (1989), Fons (1994)) supports these models. Our study examines sets of bonds issued by the same firm with equal priority in the liability structure, but with different maturities, thus holding credit quality constant. We find, counter to prior research, that risky bonds typically have upward‐sloping credit yield curves. Moreover, when we combine our matched sets of bonds (no longer controlling credit quality), the estimated slope is negative, indicating a sample selection bias problem associated with maturity.

This article examines underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned offerings in the corporate bond market. We investigate whether underpricing represents a solution to an information problem or a liquidity problem. We find that underpricing occurs with both IPOs and seasoned offerings and is highest among riskier, unknown firms. Our evidence suggests that information problems drive underpricing, with support for both the bookbuilding view of underpricing and the asymmetric information theory. We do not find evidence in favor of the Rock model of underpricing or any evidence that illiquidity causes underpricing. , Oxford University Press.

We examine the relation between institutional investors and management discipline over the last several decades to better understand how CEO turnover has increased. Using a sample of forced and voluntary turnovers, we investigate the changing roles of activism and exit among institutional investors between 1982–1994 and 1995–2006. We find evidence of activist investors throughout the sample period and their impact is consistently significant in multivariate analysis. In contrast, voting with their feet has declined to the point where it no longer affects turnover outcomes. Nonetheless, activism is fairly uncommon and does not explain the higher turnover observed over time. Block holdings of known activists have increased and are linked to improving target firms. However, other blocks merely reflect the increasing size of institutional money managers. Going forward, the increasing size of institutional investors seems likely to inhibit voting with their feet while activism remains an important vehicle for change.