We examine the effect of short sellers on corporate innovation. To establish causality, we use a policy experiment that exogenously removes the short-selling constraint for a randomly selected subsample of Russell 3000 firms. We find that innovation quality, value, and efficiency of treatment firms improve significantly more than those of control firms surrounding the policy shock. The exposure to patenting-related litigation initiated by short sellers is a plausible underlying mechanism through which short sellers discipline firm managers and enhance innovation. Our paper provides new insights into an unintended real effect of short sellers, specifically their improvement of technological innovation.

We examine the effects of financial analysts on the real economy in the case of innovation. Our baseline results show that firms covered by a larger number of analysts generate fewer patents and patents with lower impact. To establish causality, we use a difference-in-differences approach that relies on the variation generated by multiple exogenous shocks to analyst coverage, as well as an instrumental variable approach. Our identification strategies suggest a negative causal effect of analyst coverage on firm innovation. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that analysts exert too much pressure on managers to meet short-term goals, impeding firms' investment in long-term innovative projects. We further discuss possible underlying mechanisms through which analysts impede innovation and show that there is a residual effect of analysts on innovation even after controlling for these mechanisms. Our paper offers novel evidence on a previously under-explored adverse consequence of analyst coverage—its hindrance to firm innovation.

We develop a new rationale for initial public offering (IPO) waves based on product market considerations. Two firms, with differing productivity levels, compete in an industry with a significant probability of a positive productivity shock. Going public, though costly, not only allows a firm to raise external capital cheaply, but also enables it to grab market share from its private competitors. We solve for the decision of each firm to go public versus remain private, and the optimal timing of going public. In equilibrium, even firms with sufficient internal capital to fund their new investment may go public, driven by the possibility of their product market competitors going public. IPO waves may arise in equilibrium even in industries which do not experience a productivity shock. Our model predicts that firms going public during an IPO wave will have lower productivity and post-IPO profitability but larger cash holdings than those going public off the wave; it makes similar predictions for firms going public later versus earlier in an IPO wave. We empirically test and find support for these predictions.

We analyze the effects of institutional cross-ownership of same-industry firms on product market performance and behavior. Our results show that cross-held firms experience significantly higher market share growth than do non-cross-held firms. We establish causality by relying on a difference-in-differences approach based on the quasi-natural experiment of financial institution mergers. We also find evidence suggesting that institutional cross-ownership facilitates explicit forms of product market collaboration (such as within-industry joint ventures, strategic alliances, or within-industry acquisitions) and improves innovation productivity and operating profitability. Overall, our evidence indicates that cross-ownership by institutional blockholders offers strategic benefits by fostering product market coordination. Received November 12, 2015; editorial decision December 31, 2016 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

The IPO volume in the US significantly decreased after 2000, as more entrepreneurial firms exited through acquisitions rather than IPOs. Using proprietary U.S. Census data on private firms, we examine several new hypotheses to explain these phenomena. Our results support explanations based on standalone public firms’ greater sensitivity to product market competition as well as private firms’ obtaining access to more abundant PE financing in the post2000 era. In contrast, we do not find evidence consistent with an eroded private firm base after 2000 or with the economies of scope explanation that mainly focuses on firm size.

We analyze the role of institutional cross-ownership in internalizing corporate governance externalities using granular mutual fund proxy voting data. Exploiting within-proposal and within-institution variation, we show that an institution's holdings in peer firms are positively associated with the likelihood that the institution votes against management on shareholder-sponsored governance proposals. We further find that high aggregate cross-ownership positively predicts management losing a vote. Overall, our results provide evidence that cross-ownership incentivizes institutional investors to play a more active monitoring role, suggesting that institutional cross-ownership serves as a market-based mechanism to alleviate the inefficiency induced by governance externalities.

Costs are sticky on average, that is, they fall less for sales decreases than they rise for equivalent sales increases. We examine the effect of this asymmetric cost behavior on a firm's dividend policy. Given investors’ aversion to dividend cuts, we predict that firms with higher resource adjustment costs and stickier costs pay lower dividends than their peers because they are less able to sustain any higher level of dividend payouts in the future. We find evidence consistent with this prediction. Further, using a regression discontinuity design that exploits variation in labor adjustment costs generated by close‐call union elections, we provide evidence suggesting that the negative relation between cost stickiness and dividend payouts is driven by resource adjustment costs. Our paper sheds new light on the determinants of dividend policy and demonstrates the role of cost behavior in corporate decisions.

We study rating shopping on the MBS market. Outside of AAA, losses are higher on single-rated tranches than on multi-rated ones, and yields predict future losses for single-rated tranches, but not for multi-rated ones. Conversely, ratings have less explanatory power for single-rated tranches. These results suggest that single-rated tranches have been “shopped,” whereby pessimistic ratings never reach the market. For AAA-rated MBS, by contrast, 93% receive two or three such ratings, and those ratings agree 97% of the time. This ratings convergence suggests that agencies “cater” to investors, who cannot purchase a tranche unless it has multiple AAA ratings.

In this paper, we develop new insights about the dynamics of corporate dividend policy by performing the natural experiment of comparing corporate dividend policies in Hong Kong and the U.S., two economies where the tax regime and equity ownership structure are significantly different. Our empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, a test of the Lintner model reveals that the extent of dividend smoothing by firms in Hong Kong is significantly less than those in the U.S. Second, the signaling effects of dividend changes on stock returns are stronger in the U.S. compared to those in Hong Kong. Third, our logit analysis of the determinants of dividend changes indicates that, while the lagged dividend yield significantly affects dividend changes in both countries in the same fashion, prior year stock returns have opposite effects on dividend changes in the two countries. Finally, the extent of dividend smoothing is not systematically related to blockholder equity ownership in either country. Overall, our results suggest that, compared to U.S. firms, Hong Kong firms pursue a more flexible dividend policy commensurate with earnings, and that the differences between the dividend policies of firms in the two countries are consistent with the signaling implications of the differences in the tax regime across the two countries.

We compare the structure and performance of private (non-GSE) mortgage-backed securities sold by large issuers vs. those sold by small issuers over the period 2000–2006. Securities sold by large issuers have less subordination—a greater fraction of the deal receiving AAA rating—than those sold by small issuers. Prices for AAA-rated and non-AAA rated tranches sold by large issuers fell more when the market turned down than those sold by small issuers, and this difference was concentrated among tranches issued between 2004 and 2006. These results suggest that rating agencies grant favorable ratings to large issuers, especially during market booms.