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Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime

Review of Economic Studies 1985 52(2), 211
We examine the dynamic path of an economy after a change in regime, when neither the policy to be followed nor the reactions of the public are known. The model is an application of Kreps and Wilson's reputation model to Barro and Gordon's macroeconomic policy game. Equilibrium is defined to be the dynamically consistent solution to a game between the government and the private sector. It involves mixed strategies and Bayesian learning by both sides until the uncertainty about government and public behaviour is resolved. The absence of complete credibility of government policy and intransigence of private sector wage demands increase the output loss of disinflation. The analysis also sheds light on the strategic nature of economic policymaking and the role of information in macroeconomics.

Monetary policy and financial stability: What role for the futures market?

Journal of Financial Stability 2006 2(1), 95-112
This paper examines interactions between monetary policy and financial stability. There is a general view that central banks smooth interest rate changes to enhance the stability of financial markets. But might this induce a moral hazard problem, and induce financial institutions to maintain riskier portfolios, the presence of which would further inhibit active monetary policy? Hedging activities of financial institutions, such as the use of interest rate futures and swap markets to reduce risk, should further protect markets against consequences of unforeseen interest rate changes. Thus, smoothing may be both unnecessary and undesirable. The paper shows by a theoretical argument that smoothing interest rates may lead to indeterminacy of the economy's rational expectations equilibrium. Nevertheless, our empirical analysis supports the view that the Federal Reserve smoothes interest rates and reacts to interest rate futures. We add new evidence on the importance for policy of alternative indicators of financial markets stress.