Carey's four arguments against Malthusianism, 644. — Effect of environment on his thought, 647. — Relationship of wealth, utility, capital, value, and cost of reproduction, 648. — The two arguments on rent: (a) Land is capital, rents grow proportionately less; (b) The natural order of cultivation, 651. — Three possible interpretations of Carey on returns, 659. — An argument by the writer on interrelationships in the problem of proportionality, 666. — Carey and Ricardo on returns, 669. — Conclusion, 671.

We estimate demand for residential broadband using high-frequency data from subscribers facing a three-part tariff. The three-part tariff makes data usage during the billing cycle a dynamic problem, thus generating variation in the (shadow) price of usage. We provide evidence that subscribers respond to this variation, and we use their dynamic decisions to estimate a flexible distribution of willingness to pay for different plan characteristics. Using the estimates, we simulate demand under alternative pricing and find that usage-based pricing eliminates low-value traffic. Furthermore, we show that the costs associated with investment in fiber-optic networks are likely recoverable in some markets, but that there is a large gap between social and private incentives to invest.

This paper addresses three questions: (1) How severe were the episodes of banking instability experienced by the UK over the past two centuries? (2) What have been the macroeconomic indicators of UK banking instability? and (3) What have been the consequences of UK banking instability for the cost of credit? Using a unique dataset of bank share prices from 1830 to 2010 to assess the stability of the UK banking system, we find that banking instability has grown more severe since the 1970s. We also find that interest rates, inflation, lending growth, and equity prices are consistent macroeconomic indicators of UK banking instability over the long run. Furthermore, utilising a unique dataset of corporate-bond yields for the period 1860 to 2010, we find that there is a significant long-run relationship between banking instability and the credit-risk premium faced by businesses.

Old age, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. If by old age we mean the period of life characterized by a significant reduction in market work, then a major phenomenon of the last three decades has been that the old among us have gotten considerably younger. Here we briefly review this phenomenon, discuss a parallel growth in broadly defined income support, both public and private, and then provide a mechanism for relating the two.

Journal Article Recent Textbooks Get access Charles E. Persons Charles E. Persons Bobton University College of Business Administration Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 34, Issue 4, August 1920, Pages 737–756, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885164 Published: 01 August 1920

The distortion of the labor/leisure choice by social security during the period the earnings test is in effect is well known. This paper, using a life-cycle asset maximization approach to social security acceptance, shows that the earnings test is not a sufficient cause for such a distortion in the constrained period or over the life cycle. We use time-series analysis to test the net empirical importance of the substitution and wealth effects associated with social security on the market work of younger men and find that hours worked per week would have fallen from 2 to 3 hours since 1936 without the present social security system. Such findings suggest that large savings effects associated with social security are over-estimates.

We show that standard winner‐pay auctions are inept fund‐raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another’s high bid. Revenues are suppressed as a result and remain finite even when bidders value a dollar donated the same as a dollar kept. This problem does not occur in lotteries and all‐pay auctions, where bidders pay irrespective of whether they win. We introduce a general class of all‐pay auctions, rank their revenues, and illustrate how they dominate lotteries and winner‐pay formats. The optimal fund‐raising mechanism is an all‐pay auction augmented with an entry fee and reserve price.