We investigate whether and, if so, how stakeholder orientation affects the value of cash holdings by disciplining inefficient management and reducing agency costs. In so doing, we exploit the staggered enactment of constituency statutes across different states as an exogenous shock that increases the degree of stakeholder orientation substantially. Specifically, we gauge the monitoring effect of stakeholders by using the market value of cash framework of Faulkender and Wang (2006). We find that on average the marginal value of cash holdings increases significantly, both statistically and economically, after the passage of constituency statutes. The effect of constituency statutes on the value of cash holdings is stronger for firms with relatively weaker stakeholder power, high agency costs, and high information asymmetry. In subsequent tests, we show that investment efficiency in M&As and capital expenditures has improved significantly after the adoption of constituency statutes suggesting that heightened stakeholder monitoring over investments is a potential channel to enhance the value of cash holdings. Overall, our results suggest that stakeholder orientation increases the value of cash holdings by mitigating agency problems.

This paper investigates the effect of CFO gender on corporate financial reporting decision making. Focusing on firms that experience changes of CFO from male to female, the paper compares the firms' degree of accounting conservatism between pre‐ and post‐transition periods. We find that female CFO s are more conservative in their financial reporting. In addition, we find that the relation between CFO gender and conservatism varies with the level of various firm risks, including litigation risk, default risk, systematic risk, and CFO ‐specific risk such as job security risk. We further find that the risk aversion of female CFO s is associated with less equity‐based compensation, lower firm risk, a higher tangibility level, and a lower dividend payout level. Overall, the study provides strong support for the notion that female CFO s are more risk averse than male CFO s, which leads female CFO s to adopt more conservative financial reporting policies.

We examine merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions in which the acquirer and the target share a common auditor. We predict that a common auditor can help merging firms reduce uncertainty throughout the acquisition process, which allows managers to more efficiently allocate their capital, resulting in higher quality M&As. Consistent with our prediction, we find that deals with common auditors have higher acquisition announcement returns than do non-common-auditor deals. Further, we find that the common-auditor effect is more pronounced for deals with greater pre-acquisition uncertainty and deals involving acquirers and targets that are audited by the same local office of the common auditor. We also find that there is an increased probability of an M&A for firms with a common auditor. Collectively, our evidence suggests that common auditors act as information intermediaries for merging firms, resulting in higher quality acquisitions.

Using firm-level union membership data for the period of 2002–2016, we show that firms with higher union membership are more likely to engage in real earnings management than accrual-based earnings management, with abnormal production as the dominant form of real earnings management. We further show the causal effect of union membership on real earnings management by exploiting two natural experiments-the staggered enactment of state-level right-to-work (RTW) laws and the shock to unemployment insurance benefits (UIB)-as exogenous shocks to union power. Further exploration shows that the positive association between union membership and real earnings management is more pronounced for unionized firms with (1) high managerial incentives to reduce employee hiring and retention costs and (2) operating inflexibility created by labor overinvestment. Our evidence is consistent with managerial incentives for upward earnings management to mitigate employees' perceived job security and the cost of employee management in competitive labor markets.

We examine the effects of a large number of clients in an audit office using the same enterprise-resource planning (ERP) system such as SAP or Oracle resulting in what we term “client accounting system homogeneity” on audit efficiency and effectiveness. Using a unique dataset of ERP system implementations, we find that accounting system homogeneity is positively associated with audit efficiency. Specifically, we find lower (higher) audit fees for clients using an ERP system from a vendor used by a higher (lower) proportion of clients in that office. We further document that accounting system homogeneity is associated with improved audit effectiveness as proxied by two accruals-based measures, incorrect internal control weakness reporting, and restatements. Our findings are reflective of a new form of knowledge spillover from repeated experiences auditing clients using similar accounting systems, resulting in audits that are not only less expensive but also of higher quality. Data Availability: Contact the authors.