We examine whether bankers face disciplining consequences for structuring poorly performing corporate loans. We construct a novel data set containing the employment histories and loan portfolios of a large sample of corporate bankers and find that corporate credit events (i.e., downgrades, defaults, bankruptcies) increase banker turnover. The effect is pronounced when bankers issue loans with loose terms or experience severe losses. Credit events prompt bankers to adopt stricter future risk management practices, such as offering restrictive covenant packages. Overall, our findings are consistent with banks disciplining employees as a means to manage their own risk exposure.

We examine how cultural differences among agents influence the aggregate outcome of a common forecasting task. Using both exogenous shocks to sell-side analyst diversity and panel regression methods, we find that increases in analyst cultural diversity positively affect the quality of the consensus earnings forecast. We further provide evidence on the potential mechanisms underlying this result by showing that cultural diversity is associated with improvements in individual analyst forecasts, greater analyst conference call participation and interaction, and greater diversity in analyst education backgrounds and professional interests. Overall, our results indicate that greater cultural differences among agents producing an aggregate forecast are associated with a higher quality consensus forecast.