Longitudinal administrative data show that rejected male applicants to the Disability Insurance (DI) program who are younger or have low-mortality impairments such as back pain and mental health problems exhibit substantial labor force attachment. While we confirm that employment rates of older rejected applicants are low, continued high numbers of younger and low-mortality beneficiaries have raised the potential employment of DI beneficiaries. Three findings support economic inducement to apply. Mean preapplication earnings have fallen, rejected applicants experience preapplication declines in earnings, and beneficiaries whose first applications were rejected at the DDS level but who ultimately received benefits exhibit substantial employment. JEL: H55, J14, J28, J31

This paper used a general equilibrium framework to examine the macroeconomic consequences of the recent failures and subsequent bailout in the savings and loan industry. We distinguish between the losses in the capital stock, the economic effects of alternative methods of funding those real losses, and the intertemporal transfer of real resources implicit in backing the financial assets used. We then embed the analysis in a general equilibrium, multi-country model with intertemporal budget constraints that allows for the interaction of intertemporal adjustment and expectation revisions. The more complete model is used to explore the consequences of the S&L debacle on the evolution of the U.S. economy during the 1980's and 1990s.