Over a period that includes the 1998 Russian crisis and 2007–2009 financial crisis,banks with overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) were more likely to weaken lending standards and increase leverage than other banksin advance of a crisis,making them more vulnerable to the shock of the crisis.During crisis years, they generally experienced more increases in loan defaults, greater drops in operating and stock return performance, greater increases in expected default probability, and higher likelihood of CEO turnover or failure than other banks.CEO overconfidence thus canexplain the cross-sectional heterogeneity in risk-taking behavior among banks.

In this paper, we examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on bank loan spreads. Our theoretical model and empirical results support that firms with highly overconfident CEOs have lower loan spreads and that the reducing effect of these CEOs on the spread is more pronounced when the loan contracts have collateral or covenants. Unlike firms with highly overconfident CEOs, firms with moderately overconfident CEOs do not receive lower loan spreads. We perform various tests to alleviate the concerns about endogeneity, and the results are robust. The results are consistent with the idea that highly overconfident CEOs are more willing to pledge collateral and accept covenants in exchange for a reduction in their loan rate.

This study investigates how the political connections of government bank CEOs affected their banks’ performance during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Examination of global data shows that government banks with politically connected CEOs experienced significantly higher loan default rates and worse operating performance during the crisis than those without politically connected CEOs. However, these politically connected CEOs were less likely than others to be penalized for the poor performance of their banks. Our evidence suggests that politically connected CEOs of government banks can influence a bank’s lending decisions by using their political power and influence to relax lending standards and to reap private benefits that thus raise their banks’ sensitivity to a crisis.

We provide methodologies to price discretely monitored exotic options when the underlying evolves according to a double exponential jump diffusion process. We show that discrete barrier or lookback options can be approximately priced by their continuous counterparts’ pricing formulae with a simple continuity correction. The correction is justified theoretically via extending the corrected diffusion method of Siegmund (1985). We also discuss the jump effects on the performance of this continuity correction method. Numerical results show that this continuity correction performs very well especially when the proportion of jump volatility to total volatility is small. Therefore, our method is sufficiently of use for most of time.