We study an infinitely repeated first-price auction with common values. We focus on one-sided incomplete information, in which one bidder learns the objects' value, which itself does not change over time. Learning by the uninformed bidder occurs only through observation of the bids. The proprietary information is eventually revealed, and the seller extracts essentially the entire rent (for large discount factors). Both players' pay-offs tend to 0 as the discount factor tends to 1. However, the uninformed bidder does relatively better than the informed bidder. We discuss the case of two-sided incomplete information and argue that, under a Markovian refinement, the outcome is pooling as information is revealed only insofar as it does not affect prices.

We experimentally evaluate group-based financial education, savings account access, or both for members of Ugandan youth groups. We measure both short- and long-run impacts with one- and five-year endline household surveys. Education, but not account access, increases measured financial knowledge and trust at one year. At five years, knowledge effects essentially disappear, and trust effects weaken. However, savings and income increase for each treatment at both endlines, which is noteworthy given the interventions’ low cost and the long time horizon of our second endline. Exploring potential mechanisms, we find evidence consistent with multiple pathways to behavior change and outcome improvement.