Abstract We study the quantitative impact of lender control rights on corporate investment, asset prices, and the aggregate economy. We build a general equilibrium model in which the breaching of a loan covenant (technical default) entails a switch in investment control rights from borrowers to lenders. Lenders optimally choose low-risk projects, thus mitigating borrowers’ risk-taking incentives and lowering the cost of equity. This mechanism generates strong macroeconomic effects and mitigates the financial accelerator. Consistent with our model, proximity to technical default in the data is associated with 4.12% lower returns and lower exposure to systematic risk.

Abstract This paper explores implications of weak identification in common ‘long memory’ and recent ‘rough’ approaches to modeling volatility dynamics of financial assets. We unveil an asymptotic near-observational equivalence between a long memory model with weak autoregressive dynamics and a rough model with a near-unit autoregressive root. Standard methods struggle to distinguish them, and conventional asymptotics are invalid. We propose an identification-robust approach to construct confidence sets that reveal the uncertainty and aid inference. Empirical studies based on realized volatility and trading volume often fail to statistically reject either model, thereby providing evidence of their potential coexistence.