One striking feature of international portfolio investment is the extent to which equity portfolios are concentrated in the domestic equity market of the investor—the home bias puzzle. I examine the role of investors' perception of foreign investment risk on their portfolio choices. The expected returns and risk of foreign investment are specified through an asset pricing model with the home portfolio being the benchmark asset—Pastor's (2000) domestic CAPM. The model serves as a reference point around which investors can center their prior beliefs. I focus on investors' prior beliefs that are consistent with the literature on confidence in the familiar—foreign equities, in terms of both expected returns and risk, being viewed less favorably than domestic equities. These prior beliefs are then combined with the data on G7 equities, and the revised beliefs are used to obtain the global optimal asset allocation. To hold predominantly domestic equities, each G7 investor has to believe that the risk of foreign investment is several times higher than the actual risk. The home bias is more of a puzzle for a U.S. investor during the 1970s. Specifying investors' prior beliefs around the world CAPM does not help resolve the puzzle.

Using proprietary audit trail transaction data compiled by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, we investigate at the individual trader level (1) the timing and (2) the determinants of dual traders’ personal trades. Our analysis reveals an absence of any trade timing by dual traders in relation to the execution of their customers’ orders. Further examination employing correlation statistics and time series regressions provides strong support for the proposition that dual traders supply liquidity and actively manage inventory. Even after simultaneously controlling for factors representing information, liquidity supply, and inventory control, within a multivariate regression framework, liquidity supply and inventory control remain as the determinants of dual traders’ personal trades. Overall, the emergent profile of a dual trader is that of an uninformed trader performing complimentary tasks.

Does director gender influence CEO empire building? Does it affect the bid premium paid for target firms? Less overconfident female directors less overestimate merger gains. As a result, firms with female directors are less likely to make acquisitions and if they do, pay lower bid premia. Using acquisition bids by S&P 1500 companies during 1997–2009 we find that each additional female director is associated with 7.6% fewer bids, and each additional female director on a bidder board reduces the bid premium paid by 15.4%. Our findings support the notion that female directors help create shareholder value through their influence on acquisition decisions. We also discuss other possible interpretations of our findings.

Leased capital accounts for a large fraction of U.S. public firms’ total productive physical capital. In this paper, we extend the neoclassical investment q theory with financial frictions by explicitly considering firms’ option to lease. Our model features firms’ optimal buy-versus-lease decisions with collateral constraints and monitoring costs, and gives a strong implication that measured Tobin’s Q has to be adjusted by leased capital. Empirically, we use our model as guidance to construct the lease-adjusted Tobin’s Q, consistent with the recent leasing accounting change (ASC 842). We show that our lease-adjusted Tobin’s Q is a superior proxy for investment opportunities, especially for firms that rent more capital.

This paper provides new evidence on the roles and strategies adopted by different types of debtor-in-possession (DIP) lenders: “loan-to-loan” (LTL) lenders—prepetition secured bank lenders providing DIP financing, and “loan-to-own” (LTO) lenders—activist investors (i.e., hedge funds or private equity funds) providing DIP financing. We find that LTL is more likely in Chapter 11 firms with better operating performance, when prepetition bank lenders' stakes are at risk, or when they have prior lending relationships with the distressed borrower. In contrast, LTO is more likely in small firms or when prepetition bank lenders' loans are over-collateralized. Finally, we show that much of the governance improvement at the emergence is attributed to LTO lenders. We conclude that creditors of different institutional types adopt distinct strategies to enforce their control rights under Chapter 11 reorganization and to have contrasting effects on the governance outcomes of emerged firms.

We demonstrate that a financial intermediary-based asset pricing model offers a compelling explanation for a new set of conditional moments of equity term structure and convenience yields. The model’s key mechanism is that the time-varying tightness of intermediaries’ leverage constraints drives significant mean reversion in the price of risk. This model guides us in devising a novel empirical methodology to estimate the tightness of these constraints (i.e., the Relative Tightness Index) from cross-sectional returns of various asset classes. Our findings affirm that this measure significantly drives the dynamics of equity yield slope and convenience yields, both empirically and quantitatively.

To understand the link between financial intermediation activities and the real economy, we build a general equilibrium model in which agency frictions in the financial sector affect the efficiency of capital reallocation across firms and generate aggregate economic fluctuations. We develop a recursive policy iteration approach to fully characterize the nonlinear equilibrium dynamics and the off-steady-state crisis behavior. In our model, adverse shocks to agency frictions exacerbate capital misallocation and manifest themselves as variations in total factor productivity at the aggregate level. Our model endogenously generates countercyclical volatility in the aggregate time series and countercyclical dispersion in the marginal product of capital and asset returns in the cross-section.

We propose a continuous-time heterogeneous agent model consisting of fundamental, momentum, and contrarian traders to explain the significant time series momentum. We show that the performance of momentum strategy is determined by both time horizon and the market dominance of momentum traders. Specifically, when momentum traders are more active in the market, momentum strategies with short (long) time horizons stabilize (destabilize) the market, and meanwhile the market under-reacts (over-reacts) in short-run (long-run). This provides profit opportunity for time series momentum strategies with short horizons and reversal with long horizons. When momentum traders are less active in the market, they always lose. The results provide an insight into the profitability of time series momentum documented in recent empirical studies.

We study the quantitative impact of lender control rights on corporate investment, asset prices, and the aggregate economy. We build a general equilibrium model in which the breaching of a loan covenant (technical default) entails a switch in investment control rights from borrowers to lenders. Lenders optimally choose low-risk projects, thus mitigating borrowers’ risk-taking incentives and lowering the cost of equity. This mechanism generates strong macroeconomic effects and mitigates the financial accelerator. Consistent with our model, proximity to technical default in the data is associated with 4.12% lower returns and lower exposure to systematic risk.

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of a new and increasingly important phenomenon: the simultaneous holding of both equity and debt claims of the same company by non-commercial banking institutions ("dual holders"). The presence of dual holders offers a unique opportunity to assess the existence and magnitude of shareholder-creditor conflicts. We find that syndicated loans with dual holder participation have loan yield spreads that are 18--32 bps lower than those without. The difference remains economically significant after controlling for the selection effect. Further investigation of dual holders' investment horizons and changes in borrowers' credit quality lends support to the hypothesis that incentive alignment between shareholders and creditors plays an important role in lowering loan yield spreads. The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.