In oligopolistic situations, content protection can have unexpected effects as it changes the nature of interactions between input suppliers. With a duopoly, it does so in a manner that makes the foreign firm wish to match price increases and decreases of the domestic firm. Domestic input suppliers can therefore lose from such policies, even when set at free trade levels. The relation between input demands, the form of protection, and the degree of substitution between inputs is shown to define the effects of content protection and to provide the basis for understanding who might lobby for protection in different environments.

This paper looks at the predictions of a standard heterogeneous firm model regarding the exports of firms across markets in response to a particular trade policy experiment and compares these predictions to the data. A unique feature of our data is that it has information on the exports of the same firm to different markets which allows us to look for a new set of predictions of such models. We argue that while certain predictions seem consistent with the data, others are not. We then describe the patterns found in the data and argue that firm and market specific demand shocks help explain a number of these anomalies. These parsimoniously capture factors, like business contacts or networks, or even fashion shocks, that make buyers more attracted to one firm rather than another in a particular market.