Risk aversion enters many theoretical models of human capital investment, but attitudes toward risk have not been incorporated in empirical models of human capital investment. This article develops a model of the joint investment in financial wealth and human wealth to show that human capital investment is an inverse function of the degree of relative risk aversion. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, I find that wage growth is positively correlated with preferences for risk taking. More-educated individuals are also more likely to be risk takers, thus risk taking explains a portion of the returns to education.

This paper hypothesizes that the quit propensity of married men rises with an increase in their wives' income. Assuming that individuals are risk averse and that quitting is risky, the wife's income increases the husband's expected value of quitting by reducing the variance of expected family income. Using the longitudinal data from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the wife's income is found to have a large effect on quits. The average husband's quit rate increases by about 45% when the wife's income rises from zero to two-thirds that of the husband's. The wife's income effect nearly offsets the negative effect that marriage typically has on male quit rates.

The recent debate questioning whether unemployment in the 1970s represents sectoral adjustment or cyclical variation is expanded to examine comparable causes of real wage variability. Using Panel Study of Income Dynamics panel data, real wages respond more to persistent sectoral shocks than cyclical shocks in the 1970s, making recent estimates of procyclical wage variability appear weak in perspective. Employing a model of endogenous sector-specific individual skills, older workers earning economic rents are shown to have the greatest wage response to sectoral shocks. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that short run cyclical shocks may be met with hours adjustment, as specified in implicit or explicit contracts, but that persistent shocks require wage adjustment.

The earnings of married women have a more equalizing effect on the distribution of lifetime family earnings (or the expected present value of earnings) than on the distribution of annual family earnings, using Panel Study of Income Dynamics longitudinal data. The intertemporal variability of wives' labor supply causes the correlation between the lifetime earnings of husbands and wives to weaken relative to the correlation between their annual incomes, resulting in lower lifetime inequality. The inequality of potential income (full employment earnings) is found to be much greater for lifetime earnings than average annual earnings, based on alternative endogenous wage-hours models.

This paper provides the first systematic evidence on how franchi‐sors adjust their royalty rates and franchise fees as they gain fran‐chising experience. This evidence comes from a unique panel data set that we assembled on these monetary contract terms for about 1,000 franchisors each year for the 1980–92 period. We find that there is much persistence, over time, in franchise contract terms within firms. We find this despite sizable across‐firm differences in royalty rates and franchise fees. In addition, franchisors do not systematically increase or decrease their royalty rates or franchise fees as they become better established, contrary to predictions from some specific theoretical models. We conclude that variation in contract terms is mostly determined by differences across firms, not by within‐firm changes over time. Finally, we find no negative relationship, within firms, between up‐front franchise fees and royalty rates.

How and by how much do supervisors enhance worker productivity? Using a company-based data set on the productivity of technology-based services workers, we estimate supervisor effects and find them to be large. Replacing a boss who is in the lower 10% of boss quality with one who is in the upper 10% of boss quality increases a team’s total output by more than adding one worker to a nine-member team would. Workers assigned to better bosses are less likely to leave the firm. A separate normalization implies that the average boss is about 1.75 times as productive as the average worker.