ABSTRACT: Leone et al. (2006) conclude that CEO cash compensation is more sensitive to negative stock returns than to positive stock returns, due to Boards of Directors enforcing an ex post settling up on CEOs. Dechow (2006) conjectures that Leone et al.’s (2006) results might be due to the sign of stock returns misclassifying firm performance. Using three-way performance partitions, we find no asymmetry in CEO cash compensation for firms with low stock returns. Further, we find that CEO cash compensation is less sensitive to poor earnings performance than it is to better earnings performance. Thus, we find no evidence consistent with ex post settling up for poor firm performance, even among the very worst performing firms with strong corporate governance. We find similar results when examining changes in CEO bonus pay and when partitioning firm performance using earnings-based measures. In sum, our results suggest that CEO cash compensation is not punished for poor firm performance.

This paper examines the association between block ownership and market liquidity. Blockholders are believed to have access to private, value-relevant information via their roles as monitors of firms' operations. consistent with this, we find that firms with greater blockholder ownership, either by managers or external entities, have larger quoted spreads, effective spreads, adverse selection spread components, and smaller quoted depths.

We show analytically that mean analyst forecasts inefficiently aggregate information by assigning too much weight to analysts’ common information relative to their private information when used as a summary forecast measure of forthcoming earnings. A more precise summary forecast of earnings than the current mean forecast is the current mean forecast plus a positive multiple of the change in the mean forecast.

Abstract This paper investigates the relation between disclosure policy and market liquidity. Our tests examine two key aspects of market liquidity, the effective bid‐ask spread and quoted depth, and how they relate to financial analysts' ratings of firms' disclosure policies. We introduce a method of combining order sizes and depth quotes to yield more precise estimates of effective spreads on trades likely constrained by quoted depth. We find that while firms with higher rated disclosures are charged lower effective spreads, they are also quoted lower depth, consistent with the notion that better disclosures reduce information asymmetry but also cause some liquidity suppliers to exit the market. Therefore, a simple examination of spreads and depths yields ambiguous inferences on the relation between disclosure policy and market liquidity. We resolve this ambiguity by estimating depth‐adjusted effective spreads, and find that firms with higher rated disclosures have lower depth‐adjusted effective spreads across all trade sizes. Consequently, our results reveal a robust inverse relation between disclosure ratings and effective trading costs. This implies that a policy of enhanced financial disclosure is related to improved market liquidity.

ABSTRACT The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recommends that firms provide MD&A disclosures quantifying the earnings effect of reasonably likely changes in critical accounting estimates (quantitative CAE). This paper examines the determinants and consequences of quantitative CAE. We find that quantitative CAE are negatively associated with management's incentives to misreport (proxied by portfolio vega) and positively associated with audit committee accounting expertise and with audit offices with multiple quantitative CAE clients. These findings hold for the presence, initiation, number, and magnitude of quantitative CAE, and for both pension and non-pension quantitative CAE. We also find that incidences of AAERs, misstatements, and small positive earnings surprises decrease after initiation of quantitative CAE. Collectively, our findings provide insight into the use of quantitative disclosure to inform users about accounting estimation uncertainty in financial reports. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

ABSTRACT This study examines the incremental predictive power of aggregate measures of financial misreporting for recession and real gross domestic product (GDP) growth. We draw on prior research suggesting that misreporting has real economic effects because it represents misinformation on which firms base their investment, hiring, and production decisions. We find that aggregate M-Score incrementally predicts recessions at forecast horizons of five to eight quarters ahead. We also find that aggregate M-Score is significantly associated with lower future growth in real GDP, real investment, consumption, and industrial production. Additionally, our result that aggregate M-Score predicts lower real investment one to four quarters ahead partially accounts for why misreporting predicts recessions five to eight quarters ahead. Our findings are weaker when we use aggregate F-Score as a proxy for misreporting. Overall, this study provides novel evidence that aggregate misreporting measures can aid forecasters and regulators in predicting recessions and real GDP growth. JEL Classifications: M41.