This paper investigates the market structure of Arab GCC banking industry during the years of 1993–2002 using the most frequently applied measures of concentration k-bank concentration ratio (CRk) and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and evaluates the monopoly power of banks over the ten years period using the ‘H-statistic’ by Panzar and Rosse. The results show that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE have moderately concentrated markets and are moving to less concentrated positions. The measures of concentration also show that Qatar, Bahrain and Oman are highly concentrated markets. The Panzar–Rosse H-statistics suggest that banks in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE operate under perfect competition; banks in Bahrain and Qatar operate under conditions of monopolistic competition; and we are unable to reject monopolistic competition for the banking market in Oman.

This paper attempts to evaluate the competitiveness of British banking in the presence of cross-selling and switching costs during 1993–2008. It presents estimates of a model of banking behaviour that encompasses switching costs as well as cross-selling of loans and off-balance sheet transactions. The evidence from panel estimation of the model indicates that the consumer faced high switching costs in the loan market in the latter part of the sample period, as a result of weaker competitiveness in the loan market. Additionally, the weaker competitiveness in the loan market appears to facilitate the cross-selling behaviour of British banks, which helps explain the rapid growth of non-interest income during the last two decades.

This paper reports an empirical assessment of competitive conditions among the major British banks, during a period of major structural change. Specifically, estimates of the Rosse–Panzar H-statistic are reported for a panel of 12 banks for the period 1980–2004. The sample banks correspond closely to the major British banking groups specified by the British Banking Association. The robustness of the results of the Rosse–Panzar methodology is tested by estimating the ratio of Lerner indices obtained from interest rate setting equations. The results confirm the consensus finding that competition in British banking is most accurately characterised by the theoretical model of monopolistic competition. There is evidence that the intensity of competition in the core market for bank lending remained approximately unchanged throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, competition appears to have become less intense in the non-core (off-balance sheet) business of British banks.