Abstract. In this paper we present an innovative teaching tool for introductory financial accounting students that promotes active learning using methods at the frontier of market research. We describe the implementation of an asset market where students assume the role of traders in order to learn the role of information in price formation. We discuss the pedagogical questions which are addressed in the design of this market, and we relate the responses to questionnaires distributed to students at the end of the quarter. When we control for prior grade point averages (GPAs) of students, we find that those who participate in the market had better classroom performance. Résumé. Les auteurs présentent ici un instrument pédagogique innovateur, à l'intention des étudiants des cours d'introduction à la comptabilité financière, favorisant l'apprentissage dynamique grâce à l'utilisation de méthodes voisinant de près l'étude de marché. Ils décrivent la mise en place d'un marché de biens où les étudiants assument les fonctions de négociateurs en vue d'apprendre quel est le rôle de l'information dans la formation des prix. Ils analysent les questions pédagogiques que soulève la conception de ce marché et font état des réponses des étudiants aux questionnaires qui leur sont distribués à la fin du trimestre. Lorsqu'ils contrôlent les notes moyennes antérieures des étudiants, les auteurs constatent que ceux qui ont participé au marché font preuve d'un rendement supérieur en classe.

Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Reply by Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon L. Smith. Published in volume 89, issue 1, pages 340-341 of American Economic Review, March 1999

Historically, English and Dutch auctions have been used for the exchange of single objects such as works of art or single lots of a good such as produce, fish, or cut flowers. Where these institutions have been used for the exchange of multiple units, such as the Australian wool auction (using English rules), successive lots of the good are sometimes sold sequentially at auction. In some, but not all, instances this is because the goods are not identical, even though the various lots may be close substitutes (see Penny Burns, 1985). Where the goods are accepted universally as being homogeneous, as in the securities markets, multiple units are often commonly auctioned simultaneously. In the securities industry, orders are batched for simultaneous execution in multiple-unit auctions in what are referred to as markets; that is, the security is for auction at a particular point in time. This type of market is used on the stock exchanges of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Israel. Some of these are verbal, and some are sealed bid auctions. Although the U.S. organized exchanges are predominantly continuous rather than call markets (except that call markets are used each day to open trading in each listed security), there is a growing number of exceptions such as the proliferation, since 1984, of Auction Preferred Stock (Goldman, Sachs and Co., October 1984) and Money Market Preferred Stock (Lehman Brothers, July 1984). We now have Dutch Auction Rate Transferable Securities, called DARTS, Stated Rate Auction Preferred Stock, or STRAPS, and many more. After the initial subscription offering of this type of security, the market is called every 49 days to reset the preferred dividend rate using a multiple-unit auction. The exchange of shares and the dividend determination is based on the array of stated dividend rates at which existing holders and potential new holders are willing to sell and/or buy corresponding quantities. The dividend rate and exchange of shares every 49 days is executed using the uniform price or competitive sealed bid mechanism (Vernon L. Smith et al., 1980). The discussion to follow will be confined to this sealed bid form of the call market. Call markets provide temporal consolidation of trade orders or other forms of expressing the desire to buy and sell. By comparison with continuous trading, call markets offer both advantages and disadvantages (Robert A. Schwartz, 1988 pp. 442-6). The cited advantages include low cost of operating the exchange; information aggregation and presumed pricing efficiency; price stability; individual trades, which are thought to have a small impact on price; reduced price uncertainty; and, finally, nondiscriminatory pricing. However, there are offsetting disadvantages: (1) the market is inaccessible except at the time of call; (2) no bid, offer, contract, or price information is available until the results of the call are announced; and (3) there is transaction uncertainty because a submitted bid (offer) may be too low (high) to execute inside the supply-demand cross. These conditions are only partially alleviated if there is a secondary market between calls. These disadvantages may be significant. In September 1988, the Wall Street Journal published an article on the failure of a call market for the auction rate preferred stock *Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under grant no. SES-8320121.