Abstract. This study presents a logistic regression model which is used to identify U.S. companies that are likely to have their financial statements qualified for going concern reasons. The model is developed using financial statement data for a sample of failing companies. Validation tests performed on independent samples of bankrupt and nonbankrupt companies indicate that the model has reasonable explanatory power. The findings from this study indicate that the auditor's qualification for companies in financial distress is correlated with variables derived from financial statement data. The variables that are consistently identified as being closely associated with the auditor's decision whether to qualify his opinion are recurring operating losses and change in a company's liquidity position. Résumé. Cette étude présente un modèle de régression logistique utilisé afin d'identifier les sociétés américaines dont les états financiers sont susceptibles d'être accompagnés d'une opinion avec restriction quant à la permanence de l'entreprise. Le modèle est construit à l'aide de données tirées d'états financiers provenant d'un échantillon d'entreprises en difficultés. Des tests de validation effectués sur des échantillons indépendants de société faillies et non‐faillies, indiquent que le modèle démontre une capacité explicative acceptable. Les résultats de cette étude montrent une corrélation entre, d'une part, l'opinion avec restriction dans le cas de sociétés en difficultés financières et entre, d'autre part, des variables tirées des données d'états financiers. Les variables qui sont régulièrement identifiées comme étant reliées de près à la décision du vérificateur d'émettre un rapport avec restriction, sont les pertes d'exploitation répétitives et la variation dans la position de trésorerie d'une société.

Abstract An important differentiating attribute of the audit product is believed to be the credibility that the auditor is perceived to bring to an audit engagement. This study uses the context of the initial public offering (IPO) to investigate auditor credibility. It is contended that information asymmetry problems lead to a demand for credible auditors in companies going public. Entrepreneurs have incentives to signal their knowledge of favorable future earnings by selecting reputable auditors. Since there is limited information available on firms going public, employing credible auditors can convey monitoring cost advantages as well. Investment bankers also have a preference for credible auditors since they rely on audited financial statements in certifying the value of the firm and determining whether to underwrite the offering. In the present study, we consider auditor credibility in IPOs from the perspective of the client and the investment banker. If there is an increased demand for auditor credibility at the time of the IPO, there should be a significant number of credibility-increasing auditor changes prior to the offering. Further, if the investment banker benefits from having a more credible auditor sign off on statements prepared by the client, this should be reflected in the investment banker's fee structure. The empirical analysis is performed on companies that went public in 1985 and 1986. Relatively few auditor changes are observed prior to the offering. However, among those companies making auditor changes, there is a clear preference for more credible auditors. Logistic regression analysis shows that companies with prestigious investment bankers are more likely to change away from local auditors to more credible CPAs. The type of underwriting arrangement employed is also significant, consistent with an investment banker preference for credible auditors. A regression analysis is conducted, using the 1985 and 1986 IPOs, modeling investment banker compensation as a function of several factors, including type of auditor employed by the issuing firm. In the case of "firm commitment" offerings, the auditor type is found to be significant. Clients seem to be charged a smaller investment banking fee if they are associated with Big Eight auditors. There is no apparent auditor effect in the case of "best efforts" offerings. The evidence generally supports the hypothesis that investment bankers and their clients have a preference for credible auditors for the IPO.

Abstract ABSTRACT: This article discusses the accounting implications of a new type of financial security introduced on the European bond market. The security, known as a deferred-payment note, allows the investor to acquire a note by paying a portion of the issue price at the time of issuance. The remaining amount is required to be paid in a second installment due some months later. Alternative accounting treatments are presented. These treatments are evaluated in light of the FASB's conceptual framework pronouncements. The paper concludes that the FASB's current position fails to provide appropriate guidelines which the profession can use to resolve this new financial reporting issue.

Abstract ABSTRACT: This study examines the motivations for failing firms to change auditors. Some of the factors that could influence auditor switching include audit qualifications, reporting disputes, management changes, audit fees, and insurance needs. Annual reports, 10-Ks, and proxy statements were used to gather data for a sample of 132 failing (bankrupt) firms and a matched-pair sample of nonfailing firms. The investigation's findings strongly supported our prior expectations that failing firms have a greater tendency to switch auditors than do healthier firms. Other findings revealed that neither audit qualifications nor management changes were statistically associated with auditor displacement in failing firms. Failing firms that changed auditors did display a preference to move to a different class of CPA firms. Also, size did not appear to matter with respect to the observed auditor switching among the failing firms, although it appeared to have some effect among control firms. Overall, our study's major findings suggest a definite need to control for the presence of financial distress in studies on auditor switching.

Abstract Reviews the book "Current Value Accounting: Its Concepts and Practice at N.V. Philips Industries, the Netherlands," by Adolf J.H. Enthoven.

Abstract While the debt‐contracting literature has extensively examined financial covenants, there has been little attention paid to audit‐related covenants. We focus on a covenant that restricts the borrower from receiving a going‐concern audit report ( GCAR covenant). We hypothesize that a debt agreement is more likely to include a GCAR covenant as the borrower's credit quality decreases and the length of the loan period increases, and that it is more likely to impose a covenant restricting the choice of auditor when the debt includes a GCAR covenant. Also, we expect that an audit client with a GCAR covenant will be charged a higher audit fee and is more likely to receive a going‐concern audit report. We test these hypotheses on a sample of firms that issue private debt. Our results generally support our hypotheses. Our study suggests that lenders rely on the auditor's assessment in contracting, and audit‐related covenants influence auditor behavior.

ABSTRACT: The literature provides mixed evidence on whether investors find audit reports modified for going concern reasons to be useful. Using a substantially larger sample than previous studies, we observe negative excess returns when the going concern audit report (GCAR) is disclosed. We find that the reaction is more negative if the GCAR cites a problem with obtaining financing, suggesting that the GCAR provides new information to investors. Also, the reaction is more adverse if the GCAR triggers a technical violation of a debt covenant that restricts the firm from getting a GCAR. The evidence suggests that institutional investors drive the reaction to the GCAR, since there is no detectable reaction at low levels of institutional ownership. The market reaction gets more negative as the level of institutional ownership increases, and there is a decline in institutional ownership after the GCAR is issued. We attribute these results to sophisticated investors’ awareness of the firm’s financing needs and the covenants carried by the firm’s debt.

Audit clients often employ a former partner of their present auditor as an officer or a director. This “revolving door” practice presents a potential threat to auditor independence. Using the Jones (1991) model to calculate abnormal accruals for firms in 1998 and 1999, we find that firms employing former partners as officers or directors report larger signed and unsigned abnormal accruals than other firms, after controlling for other factors that plausibly affect abnormal accruals. To ensure that the results are not driven by performance characteristics of the former partner firms, we construct a performance-matched control sample and obtain consistent results. We also observe a disproportionately higher (lower) proportion of former partner firms than expected just meeting (missing) analysts' earnings forecasts.

Abstract Examines the effect Laventhol & Horwath's (L&H) disclosure of their auditor's bankruptcy and the appointment of a successor auditor on the company's stock prices. Insurance hypothesis; Investors' assignment of a value to the right to recover investment losses from the auditor; Adverse effect of bankruptcy disclosure on market prices of L&H clients.