Using a dynamic model of strategic bargaining between equity and debt holders following default, we analyze the impact of shareholder bargaining power and debt overhang on optimal investment and strategic default. Our empirical tests utilize a new measure of the debt overhang wedge based on default probabilities generated from a hazard model for bankruptcy. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, bondholder (shareholder) ownership concentration ceteris paribus enhances (weakens) the overhang wedge and dampens (increases) capital investment. We identify novel ownership-structure-related factors in firm-level capital investment and document how post-default shareholder bargaining power alleviates the underinvestment problem caused by debt overhang. Received March 26, 2018; editorial decision June 20, 2018 by Editor: Paolo Fulghieri.

We examine the joint optimization of financial leverage and irreversible capacity investment in a real options framework with risky debt and endogenous interest costs. Higher capacity, ceteris paribus, increases operating leverage and default probability, but lowers ex post adjustment costs and generates larger tax shields. A key insight is that financial leverage and capacity are substitutes in the debt market equilibrium. We develop novel predictions about the effects of capital adjustment costs, operating costs, and uncertainty on optimal financial leverage and capacity that may potentially help explain ambiguous empirical results in the literature regarding the determinants of capital structure and investment. Received March 17, 2016; editorial decision July 8, 2017 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

We survey New Zealand firms and document novel facts about their macroeconomic beliefs. There is widespread dispersion in beliefs about past and future macroeconomic conditions, especially inflation. This dispersion in beliefs is consistent with firms’ incentives to collect and process information. Using experimental methods, we find that firms update their beliefs in a Bayesian manner when presented with new information about the economy and that changes in their beliefs affect their decisions. Inflation is not generally perceived as being important to business decisions so firms devote few resources to collecting and processing information about inflation.

What economic forces limit mutual fund managers from generating consistent outperformance? We propose and test the hypothesis that buy-side competition from other funds matters. We make three contributions. First, we propose new style-based spatial methods to identify the customized rivals of each fund. Second, we construct dynamic, fund-specific measures of competition and generate measures of skill as a fund’s outperformance relative to its customized peers. Third, and finally, we show that funds outperforming their customized rivals generate future alpha when they face less competition. These results are economically significant and last for over four quarters. Received September 11, 2016; editorial decision September 26, 2017 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

We study trading costs and dealer behavior in U.S. corporate bond markets from 2006 to 2016. Despite a temporary spike during the financial crisis, average trade execution costs have not increased notably over time. However, dealer capital commitment, turnover, block trade frequency, and average trade size decreased during the financial crisis and thereafter. These declines are attributable to bank‐affiliated dealers, as nonbank dealers have increased their market commitment. Our evidence indicates that liquidity provision in the corporate bond markets is evolving away from the commitment of bank‐affiliated dealer capital to absorb customer imbalances, and that postcrisis banking regulations likely contribute.