Bond underwriters, lacking “Greenshoe options” and formal systems to track “flipping” activity, have fewer tools than equity underwriters to manage secondary market order flow uncertainty. We show that bond underwriters respond by selectively “overallocating” some issues to attain net short positions. Overallocations are economically substantive, facilitate the syndicate's price stabilization efforts, and are largely offset in the days after issuance. These issues on average experience more net selling by institutional investors and, despite large syndicate purchases, appreciate less in the secondary market. Thus, overallocation is an observable indicator that underwriters anticipate weakness in net secondary market demand.

Credit spreads for secured debt are lower than for unsecured debt, especially when a firm's credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, or average credit spreads widen. Yet investment-grade firms tend to be reluctant to issue secured debt at all times. In contrast, we find that for firms that are rated below investment grade, the likelihood of secured debt issuance increases as firm credit quality deteriorates, the economy slows, or average credit spreads widen. This differential pattern of issue behavior is consistent with highly rated firms seeing unencumbered collateral as a form of insurance, to be used only in extremis.

This study examines whether sell-side equity analysts engage in “social learning” in which their earnings forecasts for certain firms are influenced by the forecasts and outcomes of “peer” analysts associated with other firms in their respective portfolios. We find that analyst optimism is negatively correlated with recent forecast errors, by peers, on other firms in the analyst's portfolio. An analyst is also more likely to issue “bold” forecasts when peers recently issued similar forecasts for other portfolio firms. Analysts learn more from peers with similar personal characteristics. Overall, social learning benefits analysts and improves their forecast accuracy.