Child support noncompliance affects both the family and the taxpayer. This papers models the decision to pay based on expected utility maximization. The amount unpaid is determined jointly with the expected enforcement probability. A two-stage estimation technique requiring ordinary least squares and probit is used. The author improves upon previous problems with measurement error and sex-restricted data in deterrence and child support studies, the treatment of endogenous deterrence variables as exogenous, and the use of aggregate data. He finds a joint relationship between the amount unpaid and the enforcement probability. Policies are suggested for increasing compliance and payments to the family. Copyright 1988 by MIT Press.

This paper develops a correlated probit model to describe dichotomous choices that may contain a public-goods component or some other forms of interdependency. The key contribution of the paper is to formulate tests for interdependent behavior among agents. In particular, we examine the decisions by nations whether or not to ratify the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Specifically, we reject free riding as a motive for not ratifying the Protocol, and we find little evidence that individual nations were influenced by the behavior of their largest trading partners. Hence, the data suggest that, with respect to the Montreal Protocol, most nations acted without regard for the actions of other nations.