This study is the first to link managerial turnover to mutual fund managerial structure in a manner that indicates the strong presence of a conflict of interests between investors and fund sponsors in an area of fund governance where we have been led to believe there are strong and well-functioning mechanisms to guard against the exploitation of investors. I utilize the unique characteristics of mutual funds where managers sometimes manage multiple “firms” simultaneously, something not generally observed in industrial firms. I test the governance mechanisms using the mutual fund complexes management structure; unitary and multiple fund management (UFM and MFM). This study shows that UFMs tend to have higher asset growth rates and higher fees than MFMs, suggesting that sponsors can benefit more from keeping them intact. I find that changing managers under the UFM is more costly to sponsors making them more reluctant to fire poor performers. I document that underperforming UFM are −2.77% less likely to be replaced than their underperforming MFM counterparts. In addition, the conflict of interests affect the replacement decision, as high expense ratio fund managers have a lower probability of replacement for a given level of underperformance.

This paper investigates the relationship between a firm′s loan commitment demand and its overall capital structure. I develop a model which demonstrates that a loan commitment leads a firm to higher privately optimal debt level and a lower cost of debt funds; these results are driven by the loan commitment′s ability to attenuate the potential moral hazard problems attendant upon debt financing. I confront the predictions with cross-sectional data, and find that the availability of unused loan commitment financing is positively related to firm leverage and negatively related to cost of debt funds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G21, G32.

Using euro conversion as the trigger, we examine what drives volume and spread changes when stock exchanges compete. Results show average trading costs on European exchanges decrease almost 9%, and turnover increases over 30%. Trading costs decline or remain unchanged on all exchanges, but volume deteriorates in some markets and improves in others. Frankfurt, Paris, London, and Milan are winners, while Madrid and Brussels lose volume. We examine the role of the spread-volume relation, firm characteristics, exchange trading rules, and country-level factors in determining these outcomes. Results suggest that euro conversion prompted competition by increasing transparency in market prices.

Companies are sometimes accused of misleading the market. The SEC can punish this with enforcement actions. Alternatively, shareholders can seek redress through a shareholder class action (SCA). Thus, using a sample of 416 securities class actions, this paper shows that SCAs are a catalyst to promote disciplinary takeovers, CEO turnover and pay-cuts, and harm CEOs’ future job-prospects.

A structural econometric model of retirement of dual-career couples is specified and estimated with panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women. A coincidence of spouses retiring together, despite the younger ages of wives, suggests explicit efforts at coordination. The estimates suggest that one reason is a correlation of tastes for leisure. More important, each spouse, and perhaps husbands in particular, values retirement more once their spouse has retired. The opportunity set accounts for peaks in the retirement hazards of each spouse individually, but not for peaks in the simultaneous retirement of both spouses.

This article formulates a general equilibrium model for analyzing the youth labor market. At the heart of the model is an interplay between a labor force with heterogeneous ability levels and a minimum wage restriction. Ability affects performance on skilled jobs and, to a lesser extent, on unskilled jobs. Workers are less productive as youths than as adults. The model is applied to rationalize several results from available studies and to analyze the effects of three representative policies: a youth subminimum wage, subsidies paid to firms that hire youths, and subsidies that offset the costs of on-the-job training.

A structural life-cycle retirement model with an improved specification over previous models is used to analyze and compare the long-run effects on the labor supply of older workers of the 1983 Social Security reforms. The effects of separate provisions from the 1983 amendments are examined. These include the raising of the normal retirement age to 67, the increase in the delayed retirement credit to 8%, and the lowering of the reduction rate for earnings over the test amount to $1.00 for every $3.00 of earnings.

We examine the relative importance of observed and unobserved firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in determining executive compensation incentives and firm policy, risk, and performance. First, we decompose executive incentives into time-variant and time-invariant firm and manager components. Manager fixed effects supply 73% (60%) of explained variation in delta (vega). Second, controlling for manager fixed effects alters parameter estimates and corresponding inference on observed firm and manager characteristics. Third, larger CEO delta (vega) fixed effects predict better firm performance (riskier corporate policies and higher firm risk). These results suggest that the delta (vega) fixed effect captures managerial ability (risk aversion). (JEL G3, G32, G34, J24, J31, J33) Received September 7, 2018; editorial decision February 21, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

Journal Article The Demand Curves from a Quadratic Utility Indicator Get access L. L. Wegge L. L. Wegge University of California, Davis Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 35, Issue 2, April 1968, Pages 209–224, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296549 Published: 01 April 1968