This paper addresses Alvin Roth’s findings of market contracting at times earlier than optimal for market participants, which Roth describes as market “unraveling,” a market failure he proposes to solve by designing centralized buyer‐seller matching programs. This paper shows that, while Roth’s engineering solutions are ingenious, the early contracting phenomena derive from labor market monopsony. Under monopsony, price is unavailable to clear the market; time of contract becomes the currency for working out market forces. Roth’s matching serves to shore up the monopsony and would be unnecessary if the monopsony were removed; a superior solution is to end the monopsony.

In their investigation of the new PCAOB Inspections, Lennox and Pittman [Lennox, C., Pittman, J., 2009. Auditing the auditors: evidence on the recent reforms to the external monitoring of the audit firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming] address one of the most important and controversial features of the recent shift from self-regulation to government regulation in the US audit markets. In this paper I attempt to place their investigations into the broader auditing and regulatory literature, critique what we learn and do not learn from their analysis, and make suggestions for future related research.

This discussion makes several observations regarding the earnings quality research reviewed in Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) (DGS). I discuss some of the factors that led to the large growth in the earnings quality literature over the past two decades, and note a few of the important contributions from this literature. I also present what I view as several major challenges the literature faces as well as some avenues for future research. In addition, I discuss the difficulties in evaluating such a diverse body of literature, and comment on DGS’s major conclusions.

This paper argues that academics, politicians, and the media have six commonly held but misguided beliefs about corporate governance. While Armstrong et al. (2010) discuss some of these misconceptions, a wider recognition that these beliefs are actually “myths” is important. They include: (1) a common definition of “corporate governance” exists; (2) a useful distinction is “internal” versus “external” governance mechanisms; (3) outside directors perform two separable roles: to advise and monitor managers; (4) research has identified “good” and “bad” governance practices; (5) a “good” governance index can be constructed; and (6) corporate governance “best practices” can be deduced from peer data.

ABSTRACT I investigate how the use and voluntary disclosure of synthetic leases is affected by incentives to defer cash outflows and manage the financial statements by keeping debt off the balance sheet. I find that managers of cash‐constrained firms with incentives to defer cash payments are more likely to finance asset purchases with synthetic leases. The mandated reporting for synthetic leases allows managers to avoid disclosing the financial consequences of these transactions. Managers of firms with incentives to use off‐balance‐sheet financing do not provide transparent disclosure about their synthetic leases. However, managers of cash‐constrained firms, which are less likely to use synthetic leases for financial reporting reasons, do voluntarily disclose the existence and financial consequences of these contracts. Alternative tests around FIN 46 adoption corroborate these findings.

We develop and implement a technique for closed-form maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of multifactor affine yield models. We derive closed-form approximations to likelihoods for nine Dai and Singleton (2000) affine models. Simulations show our technique very accurately approximates true (but infeasible) MLE. Using US Treasury data, we estimate nine affine yield models with different market price of risk specifications. MLE allows non-nested model comparison using likelihood ratio tests; the preferred model depends on the market price of risk. Estimation with simulated and real data suggests our technique is much closer to true MLE than Euler and quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) methods.

We empirically examine whether risk-taking by publicly traded US companies declined significantly after adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Several provisions of SOX are likely to discourage risk-taking, including an expanded role for independent directors, an increase in director and officer liability, and rules related to internal controls. We find several measures of risk-taking decline significantly for US versus non-US firms after SOX. The magnitudes of the declines are related to several firm characteristics, including pre-SOX board structure, firm size, and R&D expenditures. The evidence is consistent with the proposition that SOX discourages risk-taking by public US companies.

In the context of certain models, it is possible to infer the elasticity of labor supply to the firm from the elasticity of the quit rate with respect to the wage. We use this strategy to estimate the elasticity of labor supply for men and women workers at a chain of grocery stores, identifying separation elasticities from differences in wages and separation rates across different job titles within the firm. We estimate that women have lower elasticities, so a Robinson‐style monopsony model can explain reasonably well the lower relative pay of women in the retail grocery industry.

Abstract We develop an equilibrium model in a 2-country, 2-good, pure exchange economy in which investors with logarithmic utility functions have heterogeneous beliefs about exogenously given output or endowment processes. We obtain closed-form representations of real exchange rates and of stock prices. We show that heterogeneous beliefs together with heterogeneous preferences make the volatility of real exchange rates and of stocks exhibit some properties that have been well documented in the empirical literature. These properties include the high volatility of both real exchange rates and stocks compared with that of economic fundamentals, the high correlation of stocks during periods of volatile markets. The model can also generate the clustering of the volatility of foreign exchange rates and stocks if the differences of beliefs are clustering.