Alvin Roth's Who Gets What—And Why provides a richly accessible introduction to his pioneering work on market design. Much of economics ignores the institutions that allocate goods, blithely assuming that the mythical Walrasian auctioneer will handle everything perfectly. But markets do fail and Roth details those failures, like the market for law clerks that unravels because clerks and judges commit to each other too quickly. Roth combines theory and pragmatic experience to show how the economist can engineer successful markets. He has even enabled welfare-improving trades in kidney exchanges, where law and social repugnance forbids cash payments. (JEL C78, D47)

The shape of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) term structure conveys information about the price of variance risk rather than expected changes in the VIX, a rejection of the expectations hypothesis. The second principal component, SLOPE, summarizes nearly all this information, predicting the excess returns of synthetic Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 variance swaps, VIX futures, and S&P 500 straddles for all maturities and to the exclusion of the rest of the term structure. SLOPE’s predictability is incremental to other proxies for the conditional variance risk premia, economically significant, and inconsistent with standard asset pricing models.

A model in which homebuyers make a modest approximation leads house prices to display three features present in the data but usually missing from rational models: momentum at one-year horizons, mean reversion at five-year horizons, and excess longer-term volatility relative to fundamentals. Approximating buyers assume that past prices reflect only contemporaneous demand, just like professional economists who use trends in housing prices to infer trends in housing demand. Consistent with survey evidence, this approximation leads buyers to expect increases in the market value of their homes after recent house price increases.

We describe the process through which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) makes filings “publicly available.” For a sample of Form 4 (insider trade) filings, we show that, during the period we examine, the majority of filings are available to paying subscribers of the SEC's public dissemination system (PDS) feed before they are posted to the EDGAR website, and so provide subscribers and their clients with a private advantage. We show that this advantage translates into an economically significant trading advantage, and prices, volumes, and spreads respond to the news contained in filings beginning around 30 seconds before public posting. These findings indicate that the SEC dissemination process does not always provide a level playing field and that the meaning of publicly available information in capital markets is no longer simple or obvious. In response to our study, the SEC launched an investigation and agreed to eliminate the PDS timing advantage.

We investigate the relation among trapped cash, permanently reinvested earnings, and foreign cash. We define trapped cash as cash and cash equivalents generated by foreign earnings and held by U.S. MNC's foreign subsidiaries due to concerns over repatriation taxes, and explain why trapped cash, permanently reinvested earnings, and foreign cash are not synonymous. We exploit the one-time tax rate reduction on repatriated earnings provided for under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 to construct a proxy to identify firms with trapped cash. We find R&D intensity, capital intensity, foreign growth opportunities and tax haven subsidiaries are significant indicators of trapped cash. Interestingly, we find firms with tax haven operations are less likely to have trapped cash. These findings highlight the joint role of tax havens as low-tax jurisdictions and offshore financial hubs. Finally, we investigate the relation between firm value and trapped cash. Controlling for excess cash, we find that trapped cash is negatively related to firm value, but primarily for firms with poor governance. Overall, results suggest that our measure is a parsimonious way to estimate the likelihood of having trapped cash that can be applied to a large sample of firms.

This paper extends the corporate governance literature such as Alchian and Demsetz (1972) by analyzing the use of special committees of disinterested directors by target firms during corporate takeovers. Our sample spans post Sarbanes–Oxley from 2003 through 2007, under which boards of directors are subject to increased scrutiny and additional regulatory mandates. This period is also characterized by a high level of management buyout activity that can exacerbate conflicts. Our results show that special committee use is positively related to conflicts and negatively related to factors and situations where insider knowledge is particularly valuable. Moreover, the propensity to form a committee is negatively related to the board's overall independence; hence special committees substitute for the monitoring not found in the overall board composition. Special committees, on average, are formed well in advance of the merger agreement, employ additional financial advisors, and are more likely to run an auction process. Target returns in deals with special committees are no different than deals without special committees. The evidence indicates that special committees enable target boards to adapt to situational conflicts, which helps explain when independent directors matter for corporate governance.

This study examines whether the term of the auditor–client relationship (i.e., auditor tenure) is associated with future stock price crash risk measured both ex ante and ex post. Using a large sample of U.S. public firms with Big 4 auditors, we find robust evidence that auditor tenure is negatively related to one†year†ahead stock price crash risk. The evidence is consistent with monitoring†by†learning where development of client†specific knowledge over the term of the auditor–client relationship enhances auditors’ ability to detect and deter bad news hoarding activities by clients, thereby reducing future crash risk. This result holds even after controlling for endogeneity of the tenure/crash risk relation. We further provide evidence indicating that option market investors do not fully incorporate the information contained in the term of auditor–client relationship in predicting future stock price crash risk. Our empirical results have important policy implications for regulators concerned with ensuring auditor independence.Les auteurs se demandent si la durée de la relation auditeur†client (soit la durée du mandat de l'auditeur) est en relation avec le risque d'effondrement futur du cours des actions, évalué ex ante et ex post. En étudiant un vaste échantillon de sociétés des États†Unis faisant appel public à l’épargne qui ont recours aux services des Quatre Grands cabinets d'audit, ils recueillent des preuves convaincantes que la durée du mandat de l'auditeur est en relation négative avec le risque d'effondrement du cours des actions une année à l'avance. Ces preuves sont conformes à la pratique de la « surveillance par l'apprentissage », le perfectionnement des connaissances relatives au client pendant la durée de la relation auditeur†client améliorant l'aptitude des auditeurs à déceler et prévenir chez les clients le comportement de thésaurisation des mauvaises nouvelles, ce qui a pour effet de réduire le risque d'effondrement futur. Ces résultats persistent même une fois contrôlée l'endogénéité de la relation entre la durée du mandat et le risque d'effondrement. Les auteurs produisent d'autres preuves que les investisseurs sur le marché des options n'incorporent pas entièrement l'information que recèle la durée de la relation auditeur†client dans la prévision du risque d'effondrement futur du cours des actions. Les résultats empiriques de l’étude ont d'importantes conséquences au chapitre des politiques pour les autorités de réglementation soucieuses de l'indépendance des auditeurs.

Abstract Prior research (e.g., Dechow, Huson, and Sloan ) documents that, on average, compensation practices appear to shield CEO pay from income‐decreasing special items. In some circumstances, compensation shielding can be efficient. For example, it may encourage CEOs with earnings‐sensitive pay to take an action that reduces current earnings but nevertheless enhances value. Compensation shielding can be inefficient in other circumstances, such as when a board of directors is captured by an overly powerful CEO or the magnitude of negative special items has been overstated (e.g., by shifting core expenses into special items). This paper explores whether strong governance can explain cross‐sectional variation in compensation shielding, and whether stronger governance and auditing are associated with less shifting of expenses. We find that strong corporate governance mechanisms, as captured by board (and committee) independence, the Sarbanes‐Oxley (2002) Act (SOX) and its related governance reforms, and switches to Big 4 auditors, are all associated with less compensation shielding. While our evidence suggests that strong overall governance is associated with a reduction in manipulation of core earnings through classification shifting in the cross‐section, we find inconclusive evidence to suggest that board independence or SOX influence classification shifting.

Despite the evidence that full funding of defined benefit pension obligations is value maximizing, managerial price and volatility sensitivities (deltas and vegas) do not appear to influence funded status for all except the CFOs of plan sponsors with weak credit ratings (Anantharaman and Lee, 2014). Whether realized total compensation (as opposed to changes in the value of securities held) encourages full funding is an open question. Here we examine the empirical relation between realized managerial compensation and the extent to which plan liabilities are funded, and find that CEO pay bears a significant relation with funded status.