Abstract We use an event study approach to estimate the burden of the financial regulations associated with Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) designation. On March 30, 2016, the US District Court determined that MetLife’s SIFI designation was arbitrary and capricious because the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) failed to weigh the economic cost of the financial regulation on MetLife against the benefits of increased financial stability. We find significant positive abnormal returns for MetLife and AIG on the date of the ruling. We estimate that the lifting of the SIFI designation created $1.4 billion in corporate wealth for MetLife, suggesting that MetLife would be 3.4% more profitable as a non-SIFI. These gains fall short of the $8 billion stipulated by MetLife in its complaint. We also find significant abnormal returns to SIFI institutions on the day following the US Presidential election.

Hjertstrand et al. (2016) recently tested weak separability of the direct utility function using U.S. data on consumption goods, leisure, financial and monetary assets. This paper investigates different forms of weak separability. While weak separability of the direct utility function provides the best fit, by allowing for small errors in the data we find some evidence that financial and monetary assets can be rationalized by a weakly separable indirect utility function. Further we find that M1, a modern analog of money defined by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and narrow and broader real sector aggregates can be rationalized by indirect weak separability. We also find that M1 and real sector aggregates can be rationalized by homothetic weak separability.

Abstract Rule 10b5-1 enables insiders to preplan future trades before becoming informed. Within a strategic rational expectations equilibrium framework, I characterize an insider’s unique optimal trading plan, which balances portfolio diversification against exploitation of the rule’s selective termination option. Because the rule reduces adverse selection and provides insurance against bad outcomes, the rule generally improves welfare for both the insider, who later becomes informed, and uninformed outsiders, provided there exists a sufficient degree of information asymmetry. Eliminating the rule’s selective termination option results in an even greater welfare improvement under a large subset of parametric conditions. Received March 9, 2018; editorial decision January 11, 2019 by Editor Wei Jiang.

Audit firms are organized as collections of geographically decentralized offices. Decentralization allows for increased proximity between offices and clients, improving the efficiency of auditors' interactions with client personnel. Yet decentralization also decreases the proximity between offices within each firm, potentially impeding auditors’ interactions with each other. We show that decreased proximity between offices reduces inter-office audit quality “spillovers” and that this effect is driven primarily by reduced monitoring and knowledge sharing. Our findings expand the “within office” view of audit production by demonstrating the importance of interactions between offices and the role of geographic proximity in facilitating them.

ABSTRACT We investigate whether audit offices respond to audit fee pressure by increasing their focus on nonaudit services (NAS), as well as the combined effect of audit fee pressure and an increased focus on NAS on audit quality. We find a positive association between audit fee pressure and changes in NAS at the audit office level. We also find increased rates of client misstatement among audit offices that increase focus on NAS in the presence of audit fee pressure compared to audit offices that do not, suggesting a joint effect on audit quality. We find that the reduction in audit quality occurs in large audit offices. Overall, we provide evidence that audit offices’ provision of additional NAS in the presence of fee pressure is an important dimension to consider when examining the effects of declining audit fees on audit quality.