Interest in sustainability information, from investors, managers, researchers, and others, has been expanding rapidly. We discuss recent advances and open questions related to sustainability reporting and disclosure through the lens of a supply and demand framework. Our discussion builds on prior research on financial reporting and highlights unique aspects of the provision of sustainability information.

Firms allocate significant amounts of common costs, and these allocations have implications for performance evaluation and remuneration. Non‐insulating cost allocations distribute costs based on same‐period relative performance, creating a contemporaneous interdependence between managers that in turn adds uncertainty to the link between effort and performance. In contrast, insulating cost allocations are independent of relative performance during the period and can thus be determined with greater certainty ex ante. In an experiment, we predict and find that managers' effortful performance in a stable production environment—where the pre‐allocation return for effort is constant—is higher when costs are allocated via an insulating allocation compared to when costs are allocated via a non‐insulating allocation. We further find that in an unstable production environment—where the pre‐allocation return for effort can vary from period to period—there are no differences in performance between the allocation methods when managers face a lower return for effort. Conversely, when managers face a higher return for effort in this environment, performance is greater when costs are allocated via an insulating allocation. Taken together, overall performance in the unstable production environment is greater when managers work under insulating cost allocations, suggesting the net effects of cost allocation methods are similar in each type of production environment. As such, our study identifies an important cost—lower effortful performance—of using non‐insulating methods to allocate common costs.

Internal and external parties meaningfully shape corporate tax outcomes. However, we lack a holistic understanding of the major parties involved and their comparative effects. Using proprietary IRS data for public and private firms, we identify the top executives, corporate accountants, external accounting firms, and individual tax preparers and examine the comparative importance of these parties on corporate tax outcomes. We find that external individual tax preparers matter much more than the accounting firms that employ them. Internal actors (top accountants and executives) explain more of the variation in corporate tax outcomes than external actors (individual tax preparers and accounting firms). We also find some evidence that individuals’ characteristics are associated with the tax behavior of the corporations they serve. Overall, we conclude that some of the actors who are unobservable in public data play a greater role in corporate tax outcomes than parties that are a focus of prior research.

This paper investigates how tax rates and tax enforcement jointly impact fiscal capacity in low‐income countries. We study a policy experiment in the D.R. Congo that randomly assigned 38,028 property owners to the status quo tax rate or to a rate reduction. This variation in tax liabilities reveals that the status quo rate lies above the revenue‐maximizing tax rate (RMTR). Reducing rates by about one‐third would maximize government revenue by increasing tax compliance. We then exploit two sources of variation in enforcement—randomized enforcement letters and random assignment of tax collectors—to show that the RMTR increases with enforcement. Including an enforcement message on tax letters or replacing tax collectors in the bottom quartile of enforcement capacity with average collectors would raise the RMTR by about 40%. Tax rates and enforcement are thus complementary levers. Jointly optimizing tax rates and enforcement would lead to 10% higher revenue gains than optimizing them independently. These findings provide experimental evidence that low government enforcement capacity sets a binding ceiling on the revenue‐maximizing tax rate in some developing countries, thereby demonstrating the value of increasing tax rates in tandem with enforcement to expand fiscal capacity.

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (VC directors) on executive incentives at non-venture-backed public firms. VC directors serving on the compensation committee are associated with greater CEO risk-taking incentives (vega) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (delta). These effects are more substantial if VC directors are from highly reputable VC firms. Using the change of direct flight availability to VC hub cities caused by major airline mergers and annual estimates of VC dry powder per industry as instruments, we show that these results are causal. In addition, VC directors are more focused on growth performance goals in CEO compensation contracts. We also document that prior finding of greater research intensity and innovation when VC directors serve on boards of public firms is partly explained by stronger CEO incentives instilled by such directors. Lastly, we find that having VC directors on nominating and/or governance committees is associated with a higher likelihood of forced CEO turnover.

We construct measures of industry performance and welfare in the U.S. automobile market from 1980 to 2018. We estimate a demand model using product-level data on market shares, prices, and attributes, and consumer-level data on demographics, purchases, and stated second choices. We estimate marginal costs assuming Nash-Bertrand pricing. We relate trends in consumer welfare and markups to trends in market structure and the composition of products. Although real prices rose, we find that markups decreased substantially, and the fraction of total surplus accruing to consumers increased. Consumer welfare increased over time due to improved product quality and improved production technology.

We analyse efficient risk-sharing arrangements when the value from deviating is determined endogenously by another risk-sharing arrangement. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any coalition formed (joined) after deviations rely on a belief in future cooperation which we term “trust”. We treat the contracting conditions of original and deviation coalitions symmetrically and show that higher trust tightens incentive constraints since it facilitates the formation of deviating coalitions. As a consequence, although trust facilitates the initial formation of coalitions, the extent of risk sharing in successfully formed coalitions is declining in the extent of trust and efficient allocations might feature resource burning or utility burning: trust is indeed a double-edged sword.

When race is not directly observed, regulators and analysts commonly predict it using algorithms based on last name and address. In small business lending—where regulators assess fair lending law compliance using the Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG) algorithm—we document large prediction errors among Black Americans. The errors bias measured racial disparities in loan approval rates downward by 43%, with greater bias for traditional vs. fintech lenders. Regulation using self-identified race would increase lending to Black borrowers, but also shift lending toward affluent areas because errors correlate with socioeconomics. Overall, using race proxies in policymaking and research presents challenges.

Diagnostic expectations constitute a realistic behavioural model of inference. This paper shows that this approach to expectation formation can be productively integrated into the New Keynesian framework. Diagnostic expectations generate endogenous extrapolation in general equilibrium. We show that diagnostic expectations generate extra amplification in the presence of nominal frictions; a fall in aggregate supply generates a Keynesian recession; fiscal policy is more effective at stimulating the economy. We perform Bayesian estimation of a rich medium-scale model that incorporates consensus forecast data. Our estimate of the diagnosticity parameter is in line with previous studies. Moreover, we find empirical evidence in favour of the diagnostic model. Diagnostic expectations offer new propagation mechanisms to explain fluctuations.

We investigate how the gender gap in confidence affects the views that evaluators (e.g., employers) hold about men and women. We find the confidence gap is contagious, causing evaluators to form overly pessimistic beliefs about women. This result arises even though the confidence gap is expected and even though the confidence gap shouldn’t be contagious if evaluators are Bayesian. Only an intervention that facilitates Bayesian updating proves (somewhat) effective. Additional results highlight how similar findings follow even when there is no room for discriminatory motives or differences in priors because evaluators are asked about arbitrary, rather than gender-specific, groups.