Properties are derived for the profit-maximizing price schedule in a market where the firm can observe the size of any given purchase, but cannot directly observe the number of purchases made by any given consumer. In such a market, A consumer may make multiple purchases to minimize the amount paid for a given quantity of the good. It is shown that when purchase numbers are unobservable the schedule may entail quantity premia and may be strikingly different from the schedule that obtains when the numbers of purchases are observable. In particular, some individuals may consume more under the profit-maximizing outcome than under the first-best outcome.

A monopolist may earn greater profits by setting a nonuniform price schedule (one in which the price varies with the quantity purchased) than by charging a uniform price. In general, the profit maximizing non-uniform price schedule and the welfare maximizing schedule do not coincide. Thus, there may be scope for improving market performance through regulation. The paper considers a regulator who has limited information and authority. The issues addressed centre around the question of whether the level of total market output can be taken as a measure of market performance. Conditions under which welfare is a monotonic function of the level of total output are derived. 1.

Introduction Get access Lawrence F. Katz Lawrence F. Katz Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 107, Issue 1, February 1992, Page i, https://doi.org/10.2307/2118321 Published: 01 February 1992

[I examine the effects of price discrimination on the equilibrium prices, number of firms, and level of total surplus in a monopolistically competitive market. The main finding is that uniform pricing is more (less) efficient than is price discrimination when the purchases made by the consumers who are discriminated against constitute a small (large) proportion of the total purchases.]

The author examines third-degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist in an intermediate good market. Discrimination is motivated by the fact that downstream firms differ in their abilities to integrate backward into supply of the input. The author shows that under reasonable specifications of equilibrium, price discrimination leads to all buyers facing higher input prices. In other cases, discrimination raises some prices and lowers others. The author derives conditions under which discrimination lowers welfare by reducing total output and shows that in some markets discrimination will raise welfare by preventing socially inefficient backward integration.

We examine short-run impacts of changes in residential neighborhoods on the well-being of families residing in high-poverty public housing projects who received Section 8 housing vouchers through a random lottery. Households offered vouchers experienced improvements in multiple measures of well-being relative to a control group, including increased safety, improved health among household heads, and fewer behavior problems among boys. There were no significant short-run impacts of vouchers on the employment, earnings, or welfare receipt of household heads. Children in households offered vouchers valid only in low poverty neighborhoods also had reduced likelihood of injuries, asthma attacks, and victimizations by crime.

This paper examines the effect of skill-biased technological change as measured by computerization on the recent widening of U. S. educational wage differentials. An analysis of aggregate changes in the relative supplies and wages of workers by education from 1940 to 1996 indicates strong and persistent growth in relative demand favoring college graduates. Rapid skill upgrading within detailed industries accounts for most of the growth in the relative demand for college workers, particularly since 1970. Analyses of four data sets indicate that the rate of skill upgrading has been greater in more computer-intensive industries.

A simple supply and demand framework is used to analyze changes in the U. S. wage structure from 1963 to 1987. Rapid secular growth in the demand for more-educated workers, “more-skilled” workers, and females appears to be the driving force behind observed changes in the wage structure. Measured changes in the allocation of labor between industries and occupations strongly favored college graduates and females throughout the period. Movements in the college wage premium over this period appear to be strongly related to fluctuations in the rate of growth of the supply of college graduates.

The evaluation of the quality of governmental auditors work is of keen Interest among governmental audit policy-makers. However, as there is little published evidence on which to base such evaluations at this time, this paper discusses the results of an exploratory study on the subject. The study assumes that the extent to which an auditor actually performs the audit procedures prescribed by a given audit program is an important Indicator of the quality of the auditor's work. Accordingly, responses were sought from governmental auditors at all levels of government as to their failure to perform prescribed procedures, even though they affirmed performance through sign-offs on their working papers. To offer anonymity to the respondents and to encourage truthful responses, the survey was based on the randomized response technique. The findings Indicate that a number of false sign-offs have occurred among governmental auditors as a group. Within the governmental group, the study found that false sign-off rates were slightly higher among auditors at the state level than those at the federal level. Also, rates were slightly higher among auditors not working under a civil service system than those who were, and higher among those who were not certified compared to those who were. It also found that independence of the audit function was not helpful in explaining positive false sign-off rates. However, the significance of these differences as a way of describing the false sign-off rates of governmental auditors was not strong.