We use reverse mergers to examine the impact of litigation risk on audit fees. In a reverse merger, a private company merges with a public company, and the private company's management takes over the resulting publicly traded firm. Reverse mergers create a unique test setting to provide estimates on the litigation risk premium because, while the litigation risk for formerly private firms whose equity becomes publicly traded increases, the remaining auditee‐ and auditor‐related characteristics remain virtually unchanged. We document a litigation risk premium of approximately 27 percent. Moreover, we document that equity dispersion impacts the audit fee pricing of litigation risk and this relation is dramatically magnified in the publicly traded realm. Finally, we find that institutional investors demand higher audit effort in the form of higher audit fees in both the private‐ and public‐equity settings.

This study examines the association between audit committee characteristics and the ratio of nonaudit service (NAS) fees to audit fees, using data gathered under the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) fee disclosure rules. Issues related to NAS fees have been of concern to practitioners, regulators, and academics for a number of years. Prior research suggests that audit committees possessing certain characteristics are important participants in the process of managing the client‐auditor relationship. We hypothesize that audit committees that are independent and active financial monitors have incentives to limit NAS fees (relative to audit fees) paid to incumbent auditors, in an effort to enhance auditor independence in either appearance or fact. Our analysis using a sample of 538 firms indicates that audit committees comprised solely of independent directors meeting at least four times annually are significantly and negatively associated with the NAS fee ratio. This evidence is consistent with audit committee members perceiving a high level of NAS fees in a negative light and taking actions to decrease the NAS fee ratio.

In light of the growing importance of internal audit functions (IAF) and the limited archival evidence on internal audit quality, we examine an interactive model of IAF quality (comprised of competence and independence) to better understand the determinants of IAF effectiveness as a financial reporting monitor. Our tests support the hypothesis that the joint presence of competence and independence is a necessary antecedent to effective IAF financial reporting monitoring. In sum, our results show that, the answer to “what is the effect of internal audit competence (independence) on financial reporting quality?” is “it depends on the independence (competence) of the internal auditor.” Our study extends the understanding of IAF quality determinants in the realm of financial reporting as it relates to ongoing discussions by researchers, standard setters, regulators, and practitioners.

The Big 4 auditors are inspected annually by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), with the summarized findings (labeled “audit deficiencies”) being publicly available on its website. Although the PCAOB claims that its inspection findings and process are designed to increase audit quality, there is limited empirical evidence to support this claim. We examine whether changes in revenue-deficient audit engagements are associated with subsequent year changes in client revenue quality. A revenue-deficient audit engagement is an inspected engagement that has at least one revenue-related audit deficiency. To infer audit quality, we link year-over-year changes in revenue-deficient audit engagements to the subsequent year’s change in engagement-level revenue quality—a common financial reporting quality proxy. We predict that audit firms will react asymmetrically to changes in revenue-deficient audit engagements: increases will prompt audit quality improving actions, but decreases will not. Our results support our prediction.

This study extends current literature related to nonaudit services by investigating internal audit outsourcing to the external auditor. We posit that certain types of internal audit outsourcing (i.e., those which are nonroutine, and thus tend to be nonrecurring in nature) are unlikely to lead to economic bonding, while offering significant potential for improvements in audit coverage and scope when provided by the external auditor. Alternatively, outsourcing routine internal audit tasks is more likely to lead to economic bonding, as well as potentially threatening internal auditor independence. Our results are consistent with firms with independent, active, and expert audit committees being less likely to outsource routine internal auditing activities to the external auditor. However, the outsourcing of nonroutine internal audit activities such as special projects and EDP consulting are not negatively related to effective audit committees. Additionally, outsourcing of either type of internal audit activity to an outside service provider other than the external auditor is not related to effective audit committees. Collectively, we interpret these findings as supportive of an effective audit committee's ability to monitor the sourcing of the firm's total (i.e., internal and external) audit coverage, while simultaneously exhibiting concern for external auditor independence.