We use the 2015 Chinese stock market crash to study the effects of government stock purchases. The Chinese government purchased stocks to stabilize the markets through state-owned financial institutions known as the “National Team.” We find that the intervention led to reduced volatility and price informativeness. These impacts are driven by the disclosure of government portfolios. Consistent with investors having a stronger incentive to acquire government intervention information instead of fundamental news, we find reduced information production and information asymmetry following intervention disclosure. The article suggests that government stock purchases involve a trade-off between stability and informational efficiency.

We propose an Optimal candlesticK (OK) estimator for the spot volatility using high-frequency candlestick observations. Under a standard infill asymptotic setting, we show that the OK estimator is asymptotically unbiased and has minimal asymptotic variance within a class of linear estimators. Its estimation error can be coupled by a Brownian functional, which permits valid inference. Our theoretical and numerical results suggest that the proposed candlestick-based estimator is much more accurate than the conventional spot volatility estimator based on high-frequency returns. An empirical illustration documents the intraday volatility dynamics of various assets during the Fed chairman’s recent congressional testimony.