In this paper, we study how occupation (or industry) tradability shapes local labor‐market adjustment to immigration. Theoretically, we derive a simple condition under which the arrival of foreign‐born labor into a region crowds native‐born workers out of (or into) immigrant‐intensive jobs, thus lowering (or raising) relative wages in these occupations, and we explain why this process differs within tradable versus within nontradable activities. Using data for U.S. commuting zones over the period 1980–2012, we find—consistent with our theory—that a local influx of immigrants crowds out employment of native‐born workers in more relative to less immigrant‐intensive nontradable jobs, but has no such effect across tradable occupations. Further analysis of occupation labor payments is consistent with adjustment to immigration within tradables occurring more through changes in output (versus changes in prices) when compared to adjustment within nontradables, thereby confirming our model's theoretical mechanism. We then use the model to explore the quantitative consequences of counterfactual changes in U.S. immigration on real wages at the occupation and region level.

Are firms sophisticated maximizers, or do they appear to make mistakes? Using transaction data from Ugandan value-added tax returns, we show that sellers and buyers report different amounts 79% of the time, despite invoices being easily cross-checked. Our estimates suggest that most firms are “advantageous misreporters,” but that 25% are “disadvantageous misreporters” who systematically overreport own sales minus purchases such that their tax liability increases. Similarly, many firms—especially disadvantageous misreporters—fail to VAT-report imported inputs they themselves reported at Customs, increasing their liability. On net, unilateral VAT misreporting cost Uganda about US$384 million in foregone 2013–2016 tax revenue.