This paper examines whether backlash exacerbates gender differences in time spent on low-promotability tasks. We ask whether gender differences found in previous research--women receiving more requests than men to do these tasks and women being more likely to accept such requests--amplify by the prospect of penalties for declining the request. We replicate prior findings but find no evidence that penalties increase the gender differences in task allocation. In addition, we find that the penalties men impose on others for saying “no” are larger than those imposed by women.

The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation by James Andreoni, William Harbaugh and Lise Vesterlund. Published in volume 93, issue 3, pages 893-902 of American Economic Review, June 2003

Subjective beliefs are crucial for economic inference, yet behavior can challenge the elicitation. We propose that belief elicitation should be incentive compatible not only theoretically but also in a de facto behavioral sense. To demonstrate, we show that the binarized scoring rule, a state-of-the-art elicitation, violates two weak conditions for behavioral incentive compatibility: (i) within the elicitation, information on the incentives increases deviations from truthful reporting; and (ii) in a pure choice over the set of incentives, most deviate from the theorized maximizer. Moreover, we document that deviations are systematic and center-biased, and that the elicited beliefs substantially distort inference.