We examine real outcomes for biotech startups going public around the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act. Reduced compliance costs associate with greater innovation capital formation as biotech IPO volume and proceeds increase after the JOBS Act. Biotechs, which conduct over 30% of IPOs since 2012, go public with products earlier in the FDA approval process and more frequently target rare diseases and cancer. Consistent with our survey evidence that managers use compliance savings to invest in R&D, we link the JOBS Act to post-IPO increases in project-level development, such as new patents, clinical trials, and staffing of laboratories. Post-JOBS Act product candidates are more likely to reach key milestones in the FDA approval process and these startups fail at lower rates. Benefits accrue to shareholders without sacrificing financial reporting quality. Our results demonstrate how tailoring regulations for startups can provide economic and societal benefits.

Predicted stock issuers (PSIs) are firms with expected high-investment and low-profit profiles that earn extremely low returns. We evaluate alternative explanations for this empirical phenomenon. Our results show top-PSI firms are cash-strapped, have lottery-like payoffs, high volatility, high beta, low liquidity, and high shorting costs. Over the next 2 years, top-PSI firms earn return on assets of −30% per year, report disappointing earnings, and experience strongly negative forecast revisions. They perform poorly in down markets and are six times more likely to delist for performance-related reasons. Overall, we find substantial support for mispricing, some support for nonstandard preferences, and virtually no support for the risk explanation.

Through textual analyses of 7.7 million patents, we develop a novel intercompany innovation similarity measure which enables us to find that technologically connected firms cross-predict one another’s returns. Investors impound information about firms’ technological connectedness, although not immediately and fully. Buying (shorting) shares of technological peers earning high (low) returns during the previous month yields a 1.29% monthly return. Firms’ return predictability increases with patent complexity or limited technological disclosures but decreases with better information transparency. Results suggest that investor inattention explains technology momentum. Unlike momentum stemming from simpler, class-based technological links, our Big Data text-based return predictability remains active.

Eric M. Leeper of Department of Economics, University of Virginia reviews “A Monetary and Fiscal History of the United States, 1961-2021” by Alan S. Blinder. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Examines monetary and fiscal policy in the United States since the 1960s, chronicling how stabilization policy struggled to fight recessions, unemployment, and inflation.”

Bloomfield, Marvão, and Spagnolo (2023) establish an interesting yet puzzling finding: Firms in concentrated industries that form cartels are more likely to use relative performance evaluation (RPE) compensation arrangements for their top managers. The paper interprets this as evidence that cartel members constrain managers' incentives to engage in costly sabotage when their compensation depends on their peer firms' performance. I argue that successful costly sabotage to gain an RPE advantage is extremely unlikely and that costly sabotage is more likely among cartel firms than non-cartel firms. It therefore is an unlikely explanation of the paper's main finding. I propose an alternative explanation, that RPE benchmarks include firms that are not cartel member firms.

Using hand-collected data on corporate bond and stock offerings, we identify the impact of government debt on corporate financing during World War I. The early twentieth century provides a unique opportunity to identify the impact of government debt on private financing because during this period (1) firms announced the amount they wanted to raise before each security offering and (2) the Treasury issued debt in discrete intervals. We identify the impact of Treasury issues by comparing differences in the amount firms offered to the amount they actually raised when the Treasury was borrowing to when the Treasury was not in the market. We find that long-term government bond offerings negatively affect both amount of long-term corporate bonds and dividend paying stocks issued. In contrast, we find no effect on short-term debt issue. Our findings suggest that investors view stable dividend paying stocks a close substitute for relatively safe long-term bonds.

Rachel M. McCleary of Harvard University reviews “The Economics of Religion” edited by Robert M. Sauer. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Twelve papers examine the interconnection between religiosity and economic principles, highlighting future directions for research in the emerging field of the economics of religion.”

We examine search-based peer (SBP) groups proposed by Lee, Ma, and Wang (2015) and their relationship with commonality in liquidity. Our results confirm that SBP affiliation is a significant determinant of commonality in liquidity and, unlike market- and industry-commonality, SBP-commonality has been increasing over the past 15 years. We separate retail from institutional investor queries by tracing the IP locations of Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) searches. Our results show that retail investors are responsible for roughly 85% of the EDGAR searches that generate SBP groups. Overall, our study provides new evidence of a significant demand-side commonality associated with SBP affiliations.

We investigate labor market consequences for CFOs employed by fraud firms, focusing on reputational contagion for those who are not implicated. These individuals provide an opportunity to understand reputational contagion and the nuanced meaning of “guilt” because the labor market may suspect complicity or infer negligence regardless of whether that is truly the case. We compare these CFOs to a matched sample of non‐fraud CFOs and track both turnover and subsequent employment positions. Non‐implicated CFOs are more likely to experience turnover compared to non‐fraud CFOs, driven in particular by the public revelation of fraud to the labor market. We further find that non‐implicated CFOs are more likely to obtain comparable subsequent employment than non‐fraud CFOs before the fraud is publicly revealed, but not after. In supplementary analyses, we find that turnover rates are highest for non‐implicated CFOs who started their employment with the firm before the fraud began as compared to non‐implicated CFOs who started their employment after the fraud began. These results highlight the labor market significance of the public revelation of fraud and imply that the labor market does not fully distinguish between fraud firm association and general firm performance when making executive hiring decisions.