We investigate whether a firm’s directors’ and officers’ liability insurance contract at the time of the IPO is related to insured firms’ first year post-IPO performance. We find that insurers charge a higher premium per dollar of coverage to protect the directors and officers of firms that will subsequently have poor first year post-IPO stock performance. A higher price of coverage is also associated with a higher post-IPO volatility and lower Sharpe ratio. Our results are robust to various econometric specifications and suggest that even when the high level of information asymmetry inherent to the IPO context prevails, insurers have information about the firms’ prospects that should be valuable to outside investors.

We find that common equity firms pay lower D&O insurance premiums than income trusts, an alternative and riskier ownership form. This result has wide-ranging implications for investors insofar as the information provided by D&O insurers provides investors with an unbiased signal of the firm's governance risk. The signal is unbiased because it comes from an entity (i.e. the insurer) that has a direct financial incentive to correctly assess an organization's governance risk, in contrast to other ad hoc governance measures and indices.

In this study, we conduct a stated-choice experiment to analyze the decision to contribute to either a front- or back-loaded tax-preferred retirement savings account. Our experimental design includes a randomized financial education intervention that provides information on the tax implications of both types of account. Respondents who were exposed to the intervention have greater knowledge of these accounts and make contribution choices that increase their after-tax income. Using a well-defined benchmark, we show that on average, respondents who experienced the intervention increase their discounted welfare by about 4% of their contribution amount.