Journal Article Wage Structure and Structural Unemployment Get access M. W. Reder M. W. Reder Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 31, Issue 4, October 1964, Pages 309–322, https://doi.org/10.2307/2295901 Published: 01 October 1964
Monopolistic Competition and the Stability Conditions Get access M. W. Reder M. W. Reder Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 8, Issue 2, February 1941, Pages 122–125, https://doi.org/10.2307/2967469 Published: 01 February 1941
Journal Article Welfare Economics and Rationing Get access M. W. Reder M. W. Reder New York City Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 57, Issue 1, November 1942, Pages 153–159, https://doi.org/10.2307/1881818 Published: 01 November 1942
The Review of Economics and Statistics195234(1), 34
BY comparison with the voluminous literature on the theories of the firm and consumer, the amount of space devoted to the theory of the union is small indeed. This is not accidental; it results from the fact that the behavior of firms and consumers can be easily interpreted as maximizing while that of a union cannot. In recent years, however, the theory of the union has received increased attention. For example, John T. Dunlop in his now famous volume of essays, Wage Determiinationi Under Trade Unions,' has attempted to apply the maximization principle to labor union behavior, arguing that a union typically, although not universally, attempts to maximize the money income of its membership. The thesis that unions are maximizers has served as a spur to the enunciation of at least one antithesis: Ross's theory that union behavior is determined by considerations.' Ross's view of union behavior is not entirely new, but he has given the most lucid statement of this position of which I am aware. However, his arguments have not convinced Dunlop; in the preface to the new edition of Wage Determination he argues that the importance of the political determinants of wage rates has been exaggerated by Ross and others, and that political factors (although occasionally inmportant) are, on the whole, a relatively minor factor in wage determination.3 The issue is thus joined and a rather large-scale controversy is in the making;4 the present paper is offered as a contribution to this debate. Before embarking upon the discussion proper it nmight be well to define some of the crucial concepts used. When I speak of the political aspect of union behavior, or the political determinants of such behavior, I refer to those aspects of the behavior of individuals acting in behalf of a union ' which are best understood if it is assumed that they are motivated by a concern with the interests of the union qua organization,6 rather than with the interests of its members considered as individuals. It is not alleged that the interests of a unioil organization and those of its members are always or usually in conflict; indeed, the frequent confluence of these objectives has been a source of considerable theoretical difficulty. The individuals who act on behalf of a union -hereafter called union leaders -are alleged by Ross to be best understood as seeking primarily the well-being of the union organization rather than the welfare of its members. The well-being of the union organization, as I see it,7 involves the attitudes and behavior of three groups of people toward the union organization: (i) the members of the union,8 (2) the employers of the union members, and (3) the community at large, especially as its attitude is manifested in the behavior of the government toward the union. It is not seriously denied