Abstract We document that judges’ political affiliations are strongly associated with the level of judicial penalties levied against companies. For example, Republican-appointed judges impose larger fines for hiring illegal immigrants, while Democrat-appointed judges impose larger fines for pollution- and environment-related violations. Time-series variation suggests that political partisanship, not fixed ideological differences, drives these findings. The differences become amplified when higher-court judicial vacancies exist and in the months before national elections. Our findings highlight the importance of political polarization for U.S. companies and illustrate how judicial composition can affect firms’ incentive to avoid violating laws connected to partisan issues.

We find a significant positive relation between changes in policy uncertainty and changes in credit spreads. Macroeconomic conditions, including general uncertainty, do not explain this result, which also holds when we use instrumental variables to address endogeneity issues. The impact of policy uncertainty is greater for firms that operate in regulation-intensive industries, face high tax rates, or are dependent on government spending. It is also stronger for firms that engage in political activities or rely on external financing. We conclude that policy uncertainty has a significant effect on firms’ borrowing costs, with exposure to government policies representing an important channel.

Abstract We study the effects of country-level creditor protections on the firm-level choice of debt structure concentration. Using data from forty-six countries, we show that firms form more concentrated debt structures in countries with stronger creditor protection. We propose a trade-off framework of optimal debt structure and show that in strong creditor rights regimes, the benefit of forming concentrated structures outweighs its cost. Because strong creditor protections increase liquidation bias, firms choose concentrated debt structures to improve the probability of successful distressed debt renegotiations. Firms with ex ante higher bankruptcy costs, including those with higher intangibility, cash flow volatility, R&D expenses, and leverage, exhibit stronger effects. Firms with restricted access to capital are also affected more. A difference-in-differences analysis of firms’ debt structure responses to creditor rights reforms confirms the cross-country results. Our findings are robust to alternative settings and a battery of robustness checks.