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New Evidence on the Valuation Effects of Convertible Bond Calls

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1996 31(2), 295
This study examines the wealth effects of convertible bond call announcements on stockholders, straight bondholders, and called and non-called convertible debtholders. We document that forced conversions are associated with a significant loss in firm value. The results suggest that convertible call announcements can trigger both negative signal and wealth transfer effects. We show that at least part of the negative effect on stock prices results from wealth transfer to straight bondholders. Our analysis also lends empirical validity to the common contention that called convertible bondholders suffer wealth expropriation due to the elimination of the premium. The wealth effect on non-called convertible debtholders is insignificant. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that the negative signal effect is important in explaining bond, stock, and firm excess returns. Finally, we present evidence that refutes the notion that bonds are called to relieve the firm from restrictive debt covenants.

Takeover defenses and wealth effects on securityholders: The case of poison pill adoptions

Journal of Banking & Finance 1996 20(7), 1231-1250
This is the first study to examine the valuation effects of any antitakeover amendment on both bondholders and stockholders. We present new evidence documenting that, on average, there is a significant wealth loss experienced by bondholders at poison pill adoption announcement, while stockholders are unaffected. Our finding of significant bondholder losses is consistent with the proposed negative signal hypothesis. We document results which indicate that bondholders correctly anticipate the degree of leverage increase at the time of the announcement. We also show that the proportion of insider ownership is negatively related to bondholder wealth effect at announcement. This supports the notion that higher insider (manager) ownership leads to a greater alignment of manager-stockholder interests while increasing the stockholder-bondholder agency costs. Long-run analysis of leverage and performance measures reveal that pill adopting firms are not under-leveraged as compared to their industry rivals. However, supporting the negative signal hypothesis, the leverage of sample firms rises significantly after the pill adoption. Performance measures reveal that sample firms significantly underperform their industry cohorts. This result suggests that poison pill adoptions are motivated by poor managers attempting to immunize themselves from the disciplinary actions of the corporate control market.

Valuation Consequences of Clawback Provisions

The Accounting Review 2013 88(1), 171-198
We investigate the degree to which including a clawback provision in executive compensation contracts is an effective governance mechanism by documenting the impact of clawback adoption on stock prices. We expect this ex post settling-up mechanism to be beneficial because it diminishes financial reporting risks. In support of our hypotheses, we find that the shareholders of adopting firms experience statistically significant positive stock-valuation consequences relative to propensity-score-matched control samples. Further, firms with previous financial restatements had the largest economic gains, suggesting that a clawback policy can be effective at curtailing incentives for earnings manipulation. Analysis of the bid-ask spread provides evidence that these provisions contribute to reducing financial reporting risk for restating firms, while non-restating firms experience no change in the spread. We find no evidence that clawback provisions entail costs in the form of higher CEO compensation following adoption nor do they influence the design of compensation contracts. JEL Classifications: G30; G34; G38; K12; K22. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Cross-country analysis of secular cash trends

Journal of Banking & Finance 2012 36(3), 898-912
This study documents a pronounced secular upward trend in cash holdings which is almost systemic across seven industrialized countries over 1991–2008, with France exhibiting a modest rise and Japan a substantial decline. However, the driving forces underlying the cash pattern are not uniform across countries. While the evolution in firm characteristics necessitated elevated cash balances, the time-varying firm attributes explain the cash trend only in Canada, France, UK and the US. The agency motive plays a role in the rise in cash balances in Germany. Our analysis highlights that the functioning of the financial system is crucial to corporate cash policy as Australia’s cash pattern is driven by shallow private credit markets that curbed cash reserves earlier on and the decelerating cash trend in Japan is ascribed to financial reforms. While there is a degree of commonality in the determinants of cash policies, we find some divergence in cash practices.

Executive compensation and internal capital market efficiency

Journal of Financial Intermediation 2009 18(2), 242-258
We document that chief executive officer (CEO) incentive compensation plays an important role in determining internal capital market (ICM) allocation efficiency. Our results suggest that CEO equity-based compensation can be effective in ameliorating inefficiencies in internal capital allocation decisions. We find that while stock grants play an important role in motivating CEOs to make more efficient internal capital allocation decisions, there is surprisingly no discernible influence of stock options. Our analysis supports the view that private benefits derived by managers are increasing in internal capital misallocation. We also document a strong positive link between CEO incentive compensation and excess value of diversified firms suggesting that the diversification discount can be ameliorated with CEO incentive compensation. The study contributes to the ICM literature and the literature on conglomerate diversification discount.

Convertible bond calls: resolution of the information content puzzle

Journal of Financial Intermediation 2003 12(3), 255-276
This study resolves the puzzling evidence on convertible bonds by documenting that conversion-forcing calls are indeed bad news. We find that the common stocks of calling firms substantially underperform their benchmarks by a median of 64% over the five-year post-call period. In contrast, firms that choose not to call their in-the-money convertibles exhibit no long-run abnormal performance. We show that studies drawing conclusions based on short-term price reversal immediately following the call fail to completely capture the valuation effect that occurs over a longer time horizon. We document that the market condition at the time of the call (issuance volume) and cash flow benefits related to the call (relation between dividend and after tax coupon payment) influence the post-call stock price performance. Our analysis also reveals that the post-call underperformance of high-growth firms is more pronounced than that of low-growth firms, indicating greater market exuberance associated with high-growth firms at the time of the call.