Thin equity markets cannot accommodate temporary bulges of buy or sell orders without large price movements. The resulting volatility can induce risk-averse transactors who face transaction costs to desert these markets. Thus thinness and the related price volatility may become joint self-perpetuating features of an equity market, irrespective of the volatility of asset fundamentals. If, however, appropriate incentive schemes are adopted to encourage entry by additional investors, this vicious circle can be broken, eventually shifting the market to a self-sustaining, superior equilibrium characterized by a higher number of transactors, lower price volatility and larger supply of the asset.

Since the depth and liquidity of a market depend on the entry decisions of all potential participants, each trader assesses them according to conjectures about entry by others. If trade is equally costly across markets, this externality leads to the concentration of trade on one market. If not, it can produce multiple conjectural equilibria, some where trade concentrates on one market and others where large traders resort to a separate market or to search for a trading partner. While fragmentation is welfare-reducing in the two-market case, no such ranking is possible if it involves off-exchange search.

We study a model where some investors (“hedgers”) are bad at information processing, while others (“speculators”) have superior information-processing ability and trade purely to exploit it. The disclosure of financial information induces a trade externality: if speculators refrain from trading, hedgers do the same, depressing the asset price. Market transparency reinforces this mechanism, by making speculators’ trades more visible to hedgers. Hence, issuers will oppose both the disclosure of fundamentals and trading transparency. Issuers may either under- or over-provide information compared to the socially efficient level if speculators have more bargaining power than hedgers, while they never under-provide it otherwise. When hedgers have low financial literacy, forbidding their access to the market may be socially efficient.

We distill evidence about the effects of COVID-19 on companies. Stock price reactions to the shock differed greatly across firms, depending on their resilience to social distancing, financial flexibility, and corporate culture. The same characteristics affected the response of firms’ sales, employment, and asset growth. Despite the shock, firms expanded their balance sheets and liquidity by raising funds from banks, bonds, and equity markets. While listed firms reduced their leverage, unlisted ones, especially small and medium enterprises, increased it. Government support programs helped firms access external funding. We conclude by identifying unexplored research issues regarding the long-run effects of COVID-19 on companies.

We analyze corporate fraud in a setting in which managers have superior information but are biased against liquidation because of their private benefits from empire building. This may induce them to misreport information and even bribe auditors when liquidation would be value-increasing. To curb fraud, shareholders optimally design corporate governance by jointly choosing audit quality and managerial compensation. We analyze how country-level rules affect these firm-level choices. Our analysis underscores that different country-level governance provisions have different effects on firm-level governance: Some act as substitutes of internal governance mechanisms, whereas others enhance their effectiveness and therefore complement them.

If banks have an informational monopoly about their clients, borrowers may curtail their effort level for fear of being exploited via high interest rates in the future. Banks can correct this incentive problem by committing to share private information with other lenders. The fiercer competition triggered by information sharing lowers future interest rates and future profits of banks. But, provided banks retain an initial informational advantage, their current profits are raised by the borrowers’ higher effort. This trade-off determines the banks’ willingness to share information. Their decision affects credit market competition, interest rates, volume of lending, and social welfare.

Trading systems differ in their degree of transparency, here defined as the extent to which market makers can observe the size and direction of the current order flow. We investigate whether greater transparency enhances market liquidity by reducing the opportunities for taking advantage of uninformed participants. We compare the price formation process in several stylized trading systems with different degrees of transparency: various types of auction markets and a stylized dealer market. We find that greater transparency generates lower trading costs for uninformed traders on average, although not necessarily for every size of trade.

We are delighted to announce that the winner of the 2011 Spängler IQAM Best Paper Prize is: “Operating Leverage” by Robert Novy-Marx, The two runners-up for the award are: “Inside Debt” by Alex Edmans and Qi Liu and “Fear of the Unknown: Familiarity and Economic Decisions” by Henry Cao, Bing Han, David Hirshleifer, and Harold Zhang, The awards were presented at the 2011 annual meeting of the European Finance Association in Stockholm on August 19. We are grateful to Spängler IQAM Invest for sponsoring this award.

Winners of the Best Paper Competition in Corporate Governance Get access Review of Finance, Volume 13, Issue 4, October 2009, Page v, https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfp027 Published: 01 October 2009