Does import competition alter the extent to which employers, after negotiating workers’ wages upon hire, subsequently shield those wages from external labor‐market conditions? If increased competition induces a switch away from these wage implicit agreements, then (1) the sensitivity of workers’ wages to the current unemployment rate should increase as competition increases and (2) the sensitivity of workers’ wages to the unemployment rate prevailing upon hire should decrease. Using exchange‐rate movements to generate exogenous variation in import competition, I find evidence supporting both of these predictions. I show that increased financial pressures on employers is one mechanism driving these effects.

I report on measures of life satisfaction and emotional well-being across groups of college-educated women, based on whether they have a career, a family, both, or neither. The biggest premium to life satisfaction is associated with having a family. While there is also a life satisfaction premium associated with having a career, women do not seem able to “double up” on these premiums. A qualitatively similar picture emerges from the emotional well-being data. Among college-educated women with family, those with a career spend a larger share of their day unhappy, sad, stressed and tired.

We document that nonrich households consume a larger share of their current income when exposed to higher top income and consumption levels. Permanent income, wealth effects, and upward local price pressures cannot provide the sole explanation for this finding. Instead, we show that the budget shares that nonrich households allocate to more visible goods and services rise with top income levels, consistent with status-maintaining explanations for our primary finding. Nonrich households might have saved up to 3% more annually by the mid-2000s had incomes at the top grown at the same rate as median income since the early 1980s.

Building on prior literature that constrained individuals consume the most out of a tax rebate, we study the tradeoffs high interest borrowers face when they received their 2008 tax stimulus checks. We find a persistent decline in payday borrowing in the pay cycles that follow the receipt of the tax rebate. The reduction in borrowing is a significant fraction of the mean outstanding loan (12%) and appears fairly persistent over the time, but is moderate in dollar magnitude (about $35) relative to the size of the rebate check ($600 per person). In trying to reconcile this finding with the cost of not retiring expensive payday debt, we find substantial heterogeneity across borrowers. Among individuals that we classify as temptation spenders (e.g. those that use 400 % APR loans to buy electronic goods or go on vacation), we find no reduction in payday borrowing after the tax rebate is issued, but this group represents only a small fraction of payday borrowers. A second group for which we find no debt retirement post-check is the set of borrowers that appear to use what should be short-term payday loans as a long-term financing solution. We infer that the marginal use of the tax rebate for this group was to deal with regular

We study race in the labor market by sending fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers. To manipulate perceived race, resumes are randomly assigned African-American- or White-sounding names. White names receive 50 percent more callbacks for interviews. Callbacks are also more responsive to resume quality for White names than for African-American ones. The racial gap is uniform across occupation, industry, and employer size. We also find little evidence that employers are inferring social class from the names. Differential treatment by race still appears to still be prominent in the U.S. labor market.

Four main messages emerge from the study of subjective survey data. First, a large experimental literature by and large supports economists' skepticism of subjective questions. Second, put in an econometric framework, these findings cast serious doubts on attempts to use subjective data as dependent variables, because the measurement error appears to correlate with a large set of characteristics in behaviors. Third, these data may be useful as explanatory variables. Finally, the empirical work suggests that subjective variables are useful in practice for explaining differences in behavior across individuals. Changes in answers to these questions, however, do not appear useful in explaining changes in behavior.

Who sets CEO pay? Our standard answer to this question has been shaped by principal agent theory: shareholders set CEO pay. They use pay to limit the moral hazard problem caused by the low ownership stakes of CEOs. Through bonuses, options, or long term contracts, shareholders can motivate the CEO to maximize firm wealth. In other words, shareholders use pay to provide incentives, a view we refer to as the contracting view. An alternative view, championed by practitioners such as Crystal (1991), argues that CEOs set their own pay. They manipulate the compensation committee and hence the pay process itself to pay themselves what they can. The only constraints they face may be the availability of funds or more general fears, such as not wanting to be singled out in the Wall Street Journal as being overpaid. We refer to this second view as the skimming view. In this paper, we investigate the relevance of these two views.

Much of our understanding of corporations builds on the idea that managers, when they are not closely monitored, will pursue goals that are not in shareholders' interests. But what goals would managers pursue? This paper uses variation in corporate governance generated by state adoption of antitakeover laws to empirically map out managerial preferences. We use plant-level data and exploit a unique feature of corporate law that allows us to deal with possible biases associated with the timing of the laws. We find that when managers are insulated from takeovers, worker wages (especially those of white-collar workers) rise. The destruction of old plants falls, but the creation of new plants also falls. Finally, overall productivity and profitability decline in response to these laws. Our results suggest that active empire building may not be the norm and that managers may instead prefer to enjoy the quiet life.

People are getting fat. The rise in obesity rate has been particularly pronounced in the United States since the middle of the 1970s, but has by now extended into many other areas of the world. Several sources of technological change have been singled out as potential explanations for why people have been gaining so much weight. Increased productivity in agriculture has lowered the relative price of food (Darius Lakdwalla, Tomas Philipson, and Jayanta Bhattacharya 2005) while innovations in food processing have reduced the time cost of preparing food (David M. Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser, and Jesse M. Shapiro 2003). Technological change has also affected how people spend their time, in a way that may systematically have reduced calories expended. First, physically less demanding jobs in the service sector have replaced physically more demanding jobs in agriculture and manu facturing. Second, the allocation of time across different activities has changed dramatically over the last few decades: people are spending less time working (decline in labor market work for men, decline in home production work for women) and more time in mainly sedentary forms of leisure, such as watching TV (Mark Aguiar and Erik Hurst 2007). While the focus so far has been on the rela tionship between how people spend their time and how many calories they expend, we argue in this piece that there might also be an inter esting relationship between how people spend their time and how many calories they consume. Motivating this question is a (at first glance) rather counterintuitive finding from the time use surveys: the fact that people, in the United States

In most of the developed world, skilled women marry at a lower rate than less skilled ones. We document heterogeneity across countries in how the marriage gap between skilled and unskilled women has evolved over time. As labour market opportunities for women have improved, the marriage gap has been growing in some countries but shrinking in others. We discuss the comparative statics of a theoretical model in which the (negative) social attitudes toward working women might contribute to the relatively lower marriage rate of skilled women and might also induce a non-monotonic relationship between their labour market prospects and their marriage outcomes. The model delivers predictions about how the skilled–unskilled marriage gap should react to changes in labour market opportunities across economies with more or less conservative attitudes toward working women. We verify the key predictions of this model in a panel of 26 developed countries, as well as in a panel of U.S. states.