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Investment in financial literacy and saving decisions

Journal of Banking & Finance 2013 37(8), 2779-2792
We present an intertemporal consumption model of investment in financial literacy. Consumers benefit from such investment because financial literacy allows them to increase the returns on wealth. Since literacy depreciates over time and has a cost in terms of current consumption, the model delivers an optimal investment in literacy. Furthermore, literacy and wealth are determined jointly, and are positively correlated over the life-cycle. The model drives our empirical approach to the analysis of the effect of financial literacy on wealth and saving and indicates that the stock of financial literacy early in life is a valid instrument in the regression of wealth on financial literacy. Using microeconomic and aggregate data, we find strong support for the model’s predictions.

Does poor legal enforcement make households credit-constrained?

Journal of Banking & Finance 2004 28(10), 2369-2397
This paper analyzes the relation between the quality of the legal enforcement of loan contracts and the allocation of credit to households, both theoretically and empirically. We use a model of household credit market with secured debt contracts, where the judicial system affects the cost incurred by banks to actually repossess the collateral. The model shows that the working of the judicial system affects both the probability of being credit-constrained and the equilibrium amount of debt. In the empirical part, we test our predictions using data on Italian households and on the performance of Italian judicial districts. Controlling for household characteristics, unobserved heterogeneity at judicial district level and aggregate shocks, we document that an increment in the backlog of trials pending has a statistically and economically significant positive effect on the household probability of being turned down for credit. Furthermore, we show that moving a household from the high-cost judicial district (in southern Italy) to the low-cost judicial district would reduce his probability of being credit-constrained by 50% on average, other things being equal.