Accounting performance measures, Task Uncertainty, Dysfunctional behavior

A series of studies reported in this Journal has addressed the question of whether evaluative styles of managers, which vary in terms of their reliance on accounting-based performance assessments, have systematically different behavioral consequences. These studies have produced conflicting results. In particular, Otley [1978] failed to confirm Hopwood's [1972] earlier findings that evaluative styles dominated by a heavy reliance on accounting performance measures, or a high budget-emphasis (BE), had adverse effects on job-related tension (JRT) and managerial performance. In two independent attempts to reconcile this conflict, Brownell [1982] found that a high (low) BE had positive effects on performance so long as budget participation is also high (low), and Hirst [1983] found that a high (low) BE is associated with low JRT in situations of low (high) task uncertainty. In this paper we report the results of a study which links the Brownell and Hirst attempts to reconcile the above conflict. More specifically, our objective was to assess the extent to which Brownell's finding also depends on the level of task uncertainty, the primary independent variable in the Hirst study. Arguments are presented which predict that

Abstract ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the effects of setting budget goals on task performance in different task situations. The main hypothesis developed from this analysis is that the effect of setting specific, difficult budget goals on task performance depends on the level of task uncertainty. Specifically, it is argued that, where task uncertainty is high, setting budget goals is less effective in promoting task performance than where task uncertainty is low. In addition, it is suggested that, although limited,-available evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. Finally, the research implications of the analysis are considered.

Abstract ABSTRACT: This paper is concerned with the effect of different uses of accounting performance measures on the behavior of subordinates in different situations. It is argued that the incidence of dysfunctional behavior associated with different uses of accounting performance measures is a function of task uncertainty. The main hypotheses developed from the analysis are that a medium to high (medium to low) reliance on such measures minimizes the incidence of dysfunctional behavior in situations of low (high) task uncertainty. A number of subsidiary hypotheses are developed, and it is suggested that existing evidence is consistent with these hypotheses.

Abstract. This experimental study tests the predicted effects of three performance‐contingent pay schemes on subordinate misrepresentations: profit sharing, a single‐subordinate truth‐inducing scheme, and the Groves scheme. A contribution not found in prior experimental research is the introduction of the distinction between direct and indirect misrepresentations. The results show that, as predicted, the three schemes have different abilities to deter the two types of misrepresentations. The fewest direct and indirect misrepresentations occur under the Groves scheme and the most under the linear profit‐sharing scheme. There is no significant difference between the single‐subordinate truth‐inducing scheme and the Groves scheme in the incidence of direct misrepresentations, but indirect misrepresentations are significantly more frequent under the former. Résumé. La présente étude expérimentale vise à tester certaines hypothèses relatives aux résultats de l'application de trois structures salariales liées au rendement sur les déclarations trompeuses des subordonnés: la participation linéaire aux bénéfices, une structure salariale individuelle favorisant la franchise et la structure Groves. Cette étude se démarque des etudes expérimentales antérieures en ce qu'elle introduit une distinction entre l'information trompeuse directe et indirecte. Les résultats révèlent que, conformément aux hypothèses, les trois structures salariales présentent des capacités différentes de décourager les deux formes de déclarations trompeuses. La structure Groves est celle qui occasionne le plus petit nombre de déclarations trompeuses directes et indirectes, tandis que la participation linéaire aux bénéfices est celle qui en occasionne le plus. Il n'existe pas de différence significative entre la structure salariale individuelle favorisant la franchise et la structure Groves en ce qui a trait à l'occurrence des déclarations trompeuses directes, mais les déclarations trompeuses indirectes sont beaucoup plus fréquentes dans le cas de la structure salariale individuelle.