This paper suggests that adverse selection problems in competitive annuity markets can generate quantity-constrained equilibria in which some agents, whose length of lifetime is uncertain, find it advantageous to accumulate capital privately. This occurs despite the higher rates of return on annuities. The welfare properties of these allocations are analyzed. It is shown that the level of capital accumulation is excessive in a Paretian sense. Policies that eliminate this inefficiency are discussed. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.

We extend the canonical epidemiology model to study the interaction between economic decisions and epidemics. Our model implies that people cut back on consumption and work to reduce the chances of being infected. These decisions reduce the severity of the epidemic but exacerbate the size of the associated recession. The competitive equilibrium is not socially optimal because infected people do not fully internalize the effect of their economic decisions on the spread of the virus. In our benchmark model, the best simple containment policy increases the severity of the recession but saves roughly half a million lives in the United States.

This paper examines the implications of the absence of complete annuity markets on the distribution of wealth and welfare of agents whose saving decisions are obtained under uncertainty regarding the length of their life. The absence of annuities is shown to yield a unique nondegenerate intragenerational distribution of wealth, which is fully characterized. This characterization is then used to evaluate the Pareto desirability of an annuity system. Alternative welfare criteria that can be used when the proposed change has differential impacts on the initial state of subsequent generations are considered.