This study examines how errors in measuring marginal attribute pric es vary with the form of the hedonic price function. In simulations, consumers with known utility functions bid for houses with given attributes. Various forms of the hedonic function are estimated using equilibrium housing prices. Errors in estimating marginal attribute prices are calculated by comparing each consumer's equilibrium marginal bid vector with the gradient of the hedonic function. When all attributes are observed, linear and quadratic Box-Cox forms produce lowest mean percentage errors; however, when some attributes are unobserved or are replaced by proxies, linear and linear Box-Cox functions perform best.

Maureen L. Cropper, Leland Deck, Nalin Kishor, Kenneth E. McConnell, Valuing Product Attributes Using Single Market Data: A Comparison of Hedonic and Discrete Choice Approaches, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 75, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 225-232

The federal tax code provides preferential treatment for the production and use of renewable energy. We report estimates of the subsidies' effects on greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions developed in a recent National Research Council (NRC) Report. Due to lack of estimates of the impact of tax provisions on GHG emissions, new modeling studies were commissioned. The studies found, at best, a small impact of subsidies in reducing GHG emissions; in some cases, emissions increased. The NRC report also identified the need to capture the complex interactions among subsidies, pre-existing regulations, and commodity markets.

This paper examines the EPA's decision to cancel or continue the registrations of cancer-causing pesticides that went through the special review process between 1975 and 1989. Despite claims to the contrary, our analysis indicates that the EPA indeed balanced risks against benefits in regulating pesticides: Risks to human health or the environment increased the likelihood that a particular pesticide use was canceled by the EPA; at the same time, the larger the benefits associated with a particular use, the lower was the likelihood of cancellation. Intervention by special-interest groups was also important in the regulatory process. Comments by grower organizations significantly reduced the probability of cancellation, whereas comments by environmental advocacy groups increased the probability of cancellation. Our analysis suggests that the EPA is fully capable of weighing benefits and costs when regulating environmental hazards; however, the implicit value placed on health risks--$35 million per applicator cancer case avoided--may be considered high by some persons.