We explain the clustering of underpricing in initial public offerings (IPOs). The model features an industry with aggregate demand uncertainty and asymmetric information about firms' quality. In the IPO market, firms can signal quality by underpricing or under-issuing new shares. Expected aggregate demand for the industry's products increases with the publicity that the industry creates through IPO underpricing. We show that asymmetric information and expectations on aggregate product demand interact with each other to generate multiple equilibria. Underpriced IPOs cluster in one equilibrium but not in the other. We use these results to explain why the clustering often occurs in particular industries, is short-lived, and is sensitive to economic conditions.

This study investigates whether stock market returns are related to temperature. Research in psychology has shown that temperature significantly affects mood, and mood changes in turn cause behavioral changes. Evidence suggests that lower temperature can lead to aggression, while higher temperature can lead to both apathy and aggression. Aggression could result in more risk-taking while apathy could impede risk-taking. We therefore expect lower temperature to be related to higher stock returns and higher temperature to be related to higher or lower stock returns, depending on the trade-off between the two competing effects. We examine many stock markets world-wide and find a statistically significant, negative correlation between temperature and returns across the whole range of temperature. Apathy dominates aggression when temperature is high. The observed negative correlation is robust to alternative tests and retains its statistical significance after controlling for various known anomalies.

We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay‐to‐performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay‐to‐performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm's idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.