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Preemptive Bidding and the Role of the Medium of Exchange in Acquisitions

Journal of Finance 1989
The medium of exchange in acquisitions is studied in a model where (i) bidders' offers bring forth potential competition and (ii) targets and bidders are asymmetrically informed. In equilibrium, both securities and cash offers are observed. Securities have the advantage of inducing target management to make an efficient accept/reject decision. Cash has the advantage of serving, in equilibrium, to competition by signaling a high valuation for the target. Implications concerning the medium of exchange of an offer, the probability of acceptance, the probability of competing bids, expected profits, and the costs of bidders are derived. IN STRUCTURING ITS OFFER to acquire a firm, an acquirer must, among other things, determine the medium of exchange of the offer. That is, an acquirer must choose whether the payment will be in the form of cash, debt, equity, or some combination. With symmetric information, no transactions costs, and no taxes, the medium of exchange is irrelevant. This is not the case, though, if these assumptions are not satisfied. This paper studies the role of the medium of exchange in acquisitions in a setting in which there is asymmetric information between a target and competing bidders. The focus of the paper is on the role of the medium of exchange in preempting competition. Consider a bidder that studies the profitability of an acquisition. If it makes a bid, other potential bidders will observe the bid, learn of the potentially profitable acquisition, and perhaps compete for it. A preemptive bid may be a way to eliminate this competition. Suppose a competing bidder's expected payoff is decreasing in the initial bidder's valuation for the target. When bidding against an initial bidder with a high valuation, a competitor may face a low probability of winning the bidding and a low expected payoff given that it does win. In this case, if the initial bidder could signal a sufficiently high valuation, it could deter the competition. As Fishman [7] and P'ng [18] have shown, a high bid can signal a high valuation and thus serve to preempt competition. Both studies, however, deal only with cash offers. (See also Giammarino and Heinkel [9] and Khanna [14].) A key difference between a cash offer and a (risky) securities offer is that a security's value depends on the profitability of the acquisition, while the value of cash does not. In the studies cited above, bidders, but not the target, have private

Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting

Review of Financial Studies 2007 20(6), 2079-2128
We develop an agency model of financial contracting. We derive long-term debt, a line of credit, and equity as optimal securities, capturing the debt coupon and maturity; the interest rate and limits on the credit line; inside versus outside equity; dividend policy; and capital structure dynamics. The optimal debt-equity ratio is history dependent, but debt and credit line terms are independent of the amount financed and, in some cases, the severity of the agency problem. In our model, the agent can divert cash flows; we also consider settings in which the agent undertakes hidden effort, or can control cash flow risk.

Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics

Review of Financial Studies 2007 20(1), 151-188
Agency problems limit firms' access to capital markets, curbing investment. Firms and investors seek contractual ways to mitigate these problems. What are the implications for investment? We present a theory of a firm's investment dynamics in the presence of agency problems and optimal long-term financial contracts. We derive results relating firms' investment decisions, current and past cash flows, firm size, capital structure, and dividends. Among the results, optimal investment is increasing in current and past cash flow; and optimal investment is positively serially correlated over time (after controlling for investment opportunities). These results hold for a range of agency problems.

The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1990 105(2), 427
In this paper a party with private information can verifiably disclose some, but not all, of his information. The optimal amount of discretion to allow the informed party is studied. That is, should the informed party be allowed unlimited discretion in choosing which elements of his information set to disclose, or should restrictions be imposed that limit this discretion? The model is formulated in the spirit of a “persuasion game.” It is demonstrated that under certain circumstances, rules that limit discretion increase the informativeness of disclosures and thus improve economic decisions.

Dual Trading in Futures Markets

Journal of Finance 1992 47(2), 643
With dual trading, brokers trade both for their customers and for their own account. We study dual trading and find that customers who are less likely to be informed have higher expected profits with dual trading while customers who are more likely to be informed have higher expected profits without dual trading. We also examine the effects of frontrunning. We test the major empirical implications of our model. Consistent with the model, dual traders earn higher profits than non-dual traders, and customers of dual-trading brokers do better than customers of non-dual-trading brokers.

Dual Trading in Futures Markets

Journal of Finance 1992 47(2), 643-671
With dual trading, brokers trade both for their customers and for their own account. We study dual trading and find that customers who are less likely to be informed have higher expected profits with dual trading while customers who are more likely to be informed have higher expected profits without dual trading. We also examine the effects of frontrunning. We test the major empirical implications of our model. Consistent with the model, dual traders earn higher profits than non‐dual traders, and customers of dual‐trading brokers do better than customers of non‐dual‐trading brokers.

Disclosure Decisions by Firms and the Competition for Price Efficiency

Journal of Finance 1989 44(3), 633-646
This paper develops a model of the relationship between investment decisions by firms and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities. It is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions. This provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm. Disclosure decisions are studied. It is shown that firms may expend more resources on disclosure than is socially optimal. This is in contrast to the concern implicit in mandatory disclosure rules that firms will expend too few resources on disclosure.

Self-Regulation and Government Oversight

Review of Economic Studies 2005 72(3), 687-706
Self-regulation is a feature of a number of professions. For example, in the U.S. the government delegates aspects of financial market regulation to self-regulatory organizations (SROs) like the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers. We analyse one regulatory task of an SRO, enforcing antifraud rules so agents will not cheat customers. Specifically, we model contracting/enforcement as a two-tier problem. An SRO chooses its enforcement policy: the likelihood that an agent is investigated for fraud and a penalty schedule. Given an enforcement policy, agents compete by offering contracts that maximize customers' expected utility. We assume that the SRO's objective is to maximize the welfare of its members, the agents. We show that the SRO chooses a more lax enforcement policy—meaning less frequent investigations—than what customers would choose. A general conclusion is that control of the enforcement policy governing contracts confers substantial market power to a group of otherwise competitive agents. We also investigate government oversight of the self-regulatory process. The threat of government enforcement leads to more enforcement by the SRO, just enough to pre-empt any government enforcement.

The Optimal Enforcement of Insider Trading Regulations

Journal of Political Economy 1998 106(3), 602-632
Regulating insider trading lessens the adverse selection problem facing market makers, enabling them to quote better prices. An Optimal enforcement policy must balance these benefits against the costs of enforcement. Such a policy must specify (i) the conditions under which the regulator conducts an investigation, (ii) the penalty schedule imposed if an insider is caught, and (iii) a transaction tax to fund enforcement. We derive the policy that maximizes investors welfare. This policy entails investigations following large trading volumes or large price movements or both. Insiders caught making large trades are assessed the maximum penalty, but small trades are not penalized. Given this policy, insiders trade most aggressively on news with an intermediate price impact but refrain from trading on moderate or extreme news.