This study investigates factors influencing the use of group-based compensation in professional service partnerships and the relation between group-based compensation and performance. I use data on 11,971 physicians in 935 medical groups to expand the extant literature on group incentives by providing some of the first large-sample, empirical evidence on the role of task interdependence, income risk, mutual monitoring, and group size in a firm's choice of compensation contract. Consistent with agency theory, I find that group incentives are more prevalent in medical partnerships that practice highly task-interdependent specialties and those that face greater malpractice risk. Group-based incentives are also more common in relatively small groups in which homogeneity in training, experience, and gender facilitate mutual monitoring. Tests relating individual physician productivity to compensation method suggest that productive benefits induced by group incentives offset reductions in output associated with free-riding and effort devoted to monitoring.

The balanced scorecard provides a framework for selecting multiple performance measures that supplement traditional financial measures with operating measures of customer satisfaction, internal processes, and learning and growth activities. An essential aspect of the balanced scorecard lies in its articulation of the linkage between performance measures and business strategy. This study conducts an experiment to assess how individuals' evaluations of the performance of business unit managers depend on strategically linked performance measures of a balanced scorecard. Statistical test results indicate that performance evaluations are influenced by strategically linked measures more than non-linked measures only when evaluators are provided detailed information about business unit strategies. The results also confirm Lipe and Salterio's (2000) finding that evaluators rely more on common measures than on unique measures. Evaluators rely more on strategically linked measures than on common measures when they are provided information on strategic linkages, but the reverse relation holds when they are not.

This study investigates the role that a firm’s internal audit function (IAF) plays in the disclosure of material weaknesses reported under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (U.S. Congress 2002). Using data from 214 firms, we examine the relation between material weakness (MW) disclosures and various IAF attributes and activities. Our results indicate that MW disclosures are negatively associated with the education level of the IAF and the extent to which the IAF incorporates quality assurance techniques into fieldwork, audits activities related to financial reporting, and monitors the remediation of previously identified control problems. The timing of Section 404 work and the nature of follow-up monitoring suggests that these aspects of IAF quality help prevent MWs from occurring. We find that MW disclosures are positively associated with the IAF practice of grading audit engagements and external-internal auditor coordination, suggesting that these activities increase the effectiveness of Section 404 compliance processes.