The goal of this paper is to outline the major tensions between the monopoly face of licensing versus potential consumer protection goals of occupational regulation in the health care industry. Historically, health care occupations limited supply as a method of raising earnings, but with the growth in the number of newly regulated occupations, many professions have come in conflict over who gets to do the work. Rather than having consumers decide, state legislatures and licensing boards determine the allocation of tasks. The paper outlines policies that may allow consumers rather than service providers determine the direct allocation of these jobs.

This study examines occupational licensing in the United States using a specially designed national labor force survey. Estimates from the survey indicated that 35% of employees were either licensed or certified by the government and that 29% were licensed. Another 3% stated that all who worked in their job would eventually be required to be certified or licensed, bringing the total that are or eventually must be licensed or certified by government to 38%. We find that licensing is associated with about 18% higher wages but that the effect of governmental certification on pay is much smaller.

We assess the welfare consequences of occupational licensing for workers and consumers. We estimate a model of labour market equilibrium in which licensing restricts labour supply but also affects labour demand via worker quality and selection. On the margin of occupations licensed differently between U.S. states, we find that licensing raises wages and hours but reduces employment. We estimate an average welfare loss of 12% of occupational surplus. Workers and consumers respectively bear 70% and 30% of the incidence. Higher willingness to pay offsets 80% of higher prices for consumers, and higher wages compensate workers for 60% of the cost of mandated investment in occupation-specific human capital. Welfare effects appear more favourable in occupations in which licensing is more common.

We show that occupational licensing has significant negative effects on labor market fluidity, defined as cross-occupation mobility, and positive effects on wage growth. We find that occupational licensing represents a barrier to entry for both nonemployed workers and employed ones. The effect is more prominent for employed workers than those entering from nonemployment. We also find that average wage growth is higher for licensed workers than nonlicensed workers. We find significant heterogeneity in the licensing effect across different occupation groups. These results hold across various data sources, time spans, and indicators of being licensed.

This study investigates the impact of union organization on the wages and labor practices of establishments newly organized in the 1980s. It uses a research design in which establishments are "paired" with their closest nonunion competitor. It finds that, unionism had only a modest effect on wages in the newly organized plants, which contrasts sharply with the huge union wage impact found in cross-section comparisons of union and nonunion individuals, but unionism substantially alters several personnel practices, creating grievance systems, greater seniority protection, and job bidding and posting. That newly organized establishments adopt union working conditions but grant only modest wage increases suggests that "collective voice" rather than monopoly wage gains is the key to understanding new unionism.

Employee involvement (EI) programs are the leading-edge form of personnel and labor relations in the United States. While many managers believe that these programs raise productivity and profits, the statistical evidence that EI improves the performance of firms is equivocal. The coefficients on measures of EI in production functions are usually positive but often insignificant or small (Commission on the Future of Worker–Management Relations, 1994 Ch. 2; Peter Cappelli and David Neumark, 1999) or contingent on other factors (Sandra E. Black and Lisa M. Lynch, 1997; Casey Ichniowski et al., 1997). A detailed case study of EI has further confirmed these small effects that were found in large data sets (Kleiner et al., 1999). If EI programs do not greatly affect productivity, why does business think so highly of them? In this study, we argue that the main beneficiaries of EI are workers and managers. We estimate the effects of EI on productivity using panel data on firms and the effects of EI on workers using a survey of employees and find that EI barely affects firm productivity but substantially improves worker well-being. We offer two explanations for this result.