We extend the Fama-French (1992) model by considering growth option (as well as distress/leverage) variables in explaining the cross section of stock returns. We find that growth option variables, namely growth in capital investment and yet-unexercised growth options (GO), are significantly and negatively related to stock returns. Investors may be willing to accept lower average returns from growth stocks in exchange for a more favorable (positively skewed) risk-return profile. Book-to-market (BM) ratio seems to proxy for omitted distress/leverage variables. When these are explicitly accounted for, BM is not that significant. Our growth options variables have added explanatory power.

This study extends the Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) analysis by incorporating default risk. Using data for firms that either increased or initiated cash dividend payments during the 23-year period 1986–2008, we find reduction in default risk. This reduction is shown to be a priced risk factor beyond the Fama and French (1993) risk measures, and it explains the dividend payment decision and the positive market reaction around dividend increases and initiations. Further analysis reveals that the reduction in default risk is a significant factor in explaining the 3-year excess returns following dividend increases and initiations.

In this study we use the SEC's decision to eliminate the reconciliation requirement for cross-listed companies to examine whether this loss of information prompted financial analysts to provide more informative research reports. We first document that the informativeness of analyst earnings forecasts increased, on average, in the post-regulation period for the sample of firms that stopped providing the reconciliation information (regulated firms). We next relate this change in informativeness to stock liquidity, a common proxy for information asymmetry. We do not find any change in market liquidity for regulated firms with greater analyst informativeness in the post-regulation period. In contrast, we document a decrease in market liquidity for regulated firms with lower analyst informativeness. These results support the conjecture that, when analysts compensate for the loss of information, the firm's information environment is not affected. We conclude that analysts can play an important role in capital markets as information providers and that their research can be especially valuable in times of information shortage.

We examine the empirical properties of the theoretical Black–Scholes–Merton (BSM) bankruptcy model. We evaluate the predictive ability of various existing modifications of the BSM model and extend prior studies by estimating volatility directly from market-observable returns on firm value. We show that parsimonious models using our direct market-observable volatility estimate perform better than alternative, more sophisticated, models. Our findings suggest the adoption of simpler modelling approaches relying on market data when implementing the BSM model.