There are many studies investigating the location choice of foreign direct investment (FDI) of US banks. Nigh et al. (Journal of International Business Studies 17 (1986) 59–72) find that the choice does not depend on local banking opportunity. This paper examines what factors affect the location choice of Japanese multinational financial institutions. Our results are consistent with previous studies analyzing US banks in that the FDI of the manufacturing industry is an important determinant of the location choice of Japanese financial institutions. However, our results differ from Nigh et al., in that Japanese financial institutions choose their locations at least partially based on the local banking opportunity in the host countries.

Previous research suggests that loan officers may play a critical role in relationship lending by producing soft information about SMEs. For the first time, we analyze this hypothesis and find empirical evidence that indicates that loan officer activities are associated with bank production of soft information. We also find that loan officers at small banks produce more soft information than at large banks, but large banks appear to have the equivalent potential to underwrite relationship loans. Nevertheless, large banks choose instead to focus their resources on transactions lending.

We examine the determinants of Japanese regional bank pricing-to-market decisions and their impact on the intensity of depositor discipline, in the form of the sensitivity of deposit growth to bank financial conditions. To obtain consistent estimates, we first model and estimate the bank pricing-to-market decision and then estimate the intensity of depositor discipline after conditioning for that decision. We find that banks were less likely to adopt market price accounting the larger were their unrealized securities losses. We also find statistically significant evidence of depositor discipline among banks that elected to price to market. Our results indicate that depositor discipline was more intense for the subset of banks that adopted market price accounting.

We investigate the effect of strategic investors on bank efficiency in the context of regional economic development. The data on Chinese city commercial banks operating regionally are well-suited for the study. Our findings suggest that strategic investors significantly increase efficiency in Chinese city commercial banks, while the effect of strategic investors on the efficiency of Chinese city commercial banks is negatively correlated to the level of regional economic development. The negative correlation of the effect of strategic investors on Chinese city commercial banks’ efficiency with regional economic development may be explained by the mix of local official promotion system and city commercial banks’ governance structure.