This study examines battles between short sellers and firms. Firms use a variety of methods to impede short selling, including legal threats, investigations, lawsuits, and various technical actions intended to create a short squeeze. These actions create short sale constraints. Consistent with the hypothesis that short sale constraints allow stocks to be overpriced, firms taking anti-shorting actions have in the subsequent year very low abnormal returns of about −2% per month.

One way in which corporate financial structure affects macroeconomic performance is by creating debt overhang. Debt overhang occurs when existing debt deters new investment because the benefits from new investment will go to the existing creditors, not to the new investors. If the economy is booming, debt overhang will not bind because the returns to investing are high. If the economy is stagnant, debt overhang will bind because the returns to investing are low. As a result, high levels of debt can create multiple expectational equilibria in which 'animal spirits' determine economy activity.

The aggregate dividend payout ratio forecasts excess returns on both stocks and corporate bonds in postwar U.S. data. High dividends forecast high returns. High earnings forecast low returns. The correlation of earnings with business conditions gives them predictive power for returns; they contain information about future returns that is not captured by other variables. Dividends and earnings contribute substantial explanatory power at short horizons. For forecasting long‐horizon returns, however, only (scaled) stock prices matter. Forecasts of low long‐horizon stock returns in the mid‐1990s are caused not by earnings or dividends, but by high stock prices.

Using data from the 1986 oil price decrease, I examine the capital expenditures of nonoil subsidiaries of oil companies. I test the joint hypothesis that 1) a decrease in cash/collateral decreases investment, holding fixed the profitability of investment, and 2) the finance costs of different parts of the same corporation are interdependent. The results support this joint hypothesis: oil companies significantly reduced their nonoil investment compared to the median industry investment. The 1986 decline in investment was concentrated in nonoil units that were subsidized by the rest of the company in 1985.

When the discount rate falls, investment should rise. Thus with time‐varying discount rates and instantly changing investment, investment should positively covary with current stock returns and negatively covary with future stock returns. Aggregate nonresidential U.S. investment contradicts both these implications, probably because of investment lags. Investment plans, however, satisfy both implications. These investment plans, from a U.S. government survey of firms, are highly informative measures of expected investment and explain more than three‐quarters of the variation in real annual aggregate investment growth. Plans have substantial forecasting power for excess stock returns, showing that time‐varying risk premia affect investment.

We use mutual fund flows as a measure of individual investor sentiment for different stocks, and find that high sentiment predicts low future returns. Fund flows are dumb money–by reallocating across different mutual funds, retail investors reduce their wealth in the long run. This dumb money effect is related to the value effect: high sentiment stocks tend to be growth stocks. High sentiment also is associated with high corporate issuance, interpretable as companies increasing the supply of shares in response to investor demand.

Does corporate diversification reduce shareholder value? Since firms endogenously choose to diversify, exogenous variation in diversification is necessary to draw inferences about the causal effect. We examine changes in the within-firm dispersion of industry investment, or “diversity”. We find that exogenous changes in diversity, due to changes in industry investment, are negatively related to firm value. Thus diversification destroys value, consistent with the inefficient internal capital markets hypothesis. Measurement error does not cause this finding. We also find that exogenous changes in industry cash flow diversity are negatively related to firm value.

Journal Article Financial Constraints and Stock Returns Get access Owen Lamont, Owen Lamont University of Chicago and NBER Address correspondence to Owen Lamont, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 E. 58th St., Chicago, IL 60637, or e-mail: [email protected]. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Christopher Polk, Christopher Polk Northwestern University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Jesús Saaá-Requejo Jesús Saaá-Requejo Vega Asset Management Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 14, Issue 2, April 2001, Pages 529–554, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/14.2.529 Published: 21 June 2015

We document that net equity issuance is considerably more sensitive to aggregate stock returns and Q's than to firm-level stock returns and Q's. Very similar patterns also emerge when we look at merger activity. In light of earlier work (Campbell 1991, Vuolteenaho 2002) which finds that aggregate stock returns are less informative about future cashflows than are firm-level stock returns--and thus, potentially more strongly influenced by investor sentiment--these results suggest that both equity issuance and mergers are to a significant extent driven by market-timing considerations, as opposed to by purely fundamental factors.